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Abstract:  
 
We examine how far fertility trends respond to family policies in OECD countries. In the light 
of the recent fertility rebound observed in several OECD countries, we empirically test the 
impact of different family policy settings on fertility, using data from 18 OECD countries that 
spans the years 1982 to 2007. Our results confirm that each instrument of the family policy 
package  (paid  leave,  childcare  services  and  financial  transfers)  has  a  positive  influence, 
suggesting that the addition of these supports for working parents in a continuum during the 
early childhood is likely to facilitate parents’ choice to have children. Policy levers do not 
have similar weight, however: in-cash benefits covering childhood after the year of childbirth 
and the coverage of childcare services for children under age three have a larger potential 
influence  on  fertility  than  leave  entitlements  and  benefits  granted  around  childbirth.  Our 
findings are robust once controlling for birth postponement, endogeneity, time lagged fertility 
reactions  and  for  different  national  contexts,  such  as  economic  development,  female 
employment rates, labour market insecurity and childbearing norms. 
Keywords:  family  policies;  fertility;  demographic  economics;  female  employment; 
economics of gender 











































2  3 
Introduction 
 
After decades of continuous decline, fertility rates have started to increase again in many 
OECD countries since the early 2000s. The overall rise is rather limited, with a total fertility 
rate (TFR) that reached a low of 1.63 in 1999 before rising to 1.71 in 2008, on average, in the 
OECD countries. However, many countries have experienced a more significant “rebound”, 
notably in Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Czech Republic, Finland, France, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. This reversal is 
arguably one consequence of the “postponement” of childbearing  across  cohorts:  delayed 
childbearing among the younger generations brought down periodic fertility rates, but this 
trend was later reversed, mainly in countries where fertility increased significantly among 
women aged 30 and above and not counterbalanced by a further reduction among the younger 
(Goldstein et al., 2009).  
Other factors help to explain why the fertility rebound happened in some, but not in all OECD 
countries.  Some  reference  to  the  economic  theory  of  fertility  decision  might  help  to 
understand the incidence of these factors. Economic theory typically considers fertility as the 
outcome of a rational decision: a utility-maximisation process balancing costs and benefits of 
children, subject to an income constraint and preferences for children (Becker, 1981). Raising 
and educating children are activities that require income, goods and time especially. Having 
children competes with other time-consuming activities, such as work and leisure, and the 
decision  to  have  children  will  also  depend  on  the  “quality”  of  the  investments  made  in 
children (Becker, 1960). Thus, having children incurs both a direct and visible cost and an 
indirect and less visible one (Willis, 1973), and the increase of these costs is considered as a 
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Economic  development  is  a  first  factor  by  which  fertility  behaviour  can  be  affected,  as 
economic advancement leads to an increase in income per capita. In theory, such an increase 
might alleviate part of the budgetary constraint that can hamper households to have their 
desired number of children. In that case, economic advancement would lead to an increase in 
fertility. However, several factors can drive the relation in the other direction. Becker et al. 
(1990) argue, for example, that when individual investments in human capital increase as in a 
period of rapid technological progress, families find it optimal to have fewer children, and to 
provide each child with a high level of human capital. This high level of human capital also 
leads, at the aggregate level, to high rates of economic growth and a fertility decline, as we 
observed it during the demographic transition (Barro and Becker, 1989; Doepke, 2004). In 
addition,  an  increase  in  capital  intensity  of  the  economy  (possibly  due  to  technological 
progress) is likely to increase the relative wages of women who also benefit from the average 
increase in their educational attainment (Galor and Weil (1996). Women are thus likely to 
substitute out of childrearing and into market labour. Both higher wage earnings (and thus 
savings) and reduced population growth increase the level of capital per worker. Thus, high 
relative wages for women are both a product of, and a causal factor in, economic growth and 
fertility decline.   
However, the decrease in fertility might happen in a first period only when the possibility to 
substitute maternal care by goods or purchased service are limited (Day, 2004). In this case, a 
subsidy to child-care goods and services is likely to prolong the fertility decline because of 
the high degree of complementarity between childcare goods and parental time.  However, 
trends  might  reverse  in  a  second  period  once  parents  have  the  opportunity  to  substitute 
parental (or maternal) care by goods or purchased childcare service. In all, a high rate of 
subsidy to child-care goods and services will raise the level of fertility but may postpone the 
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This prediction meets the empirical findings that economic development is linked to a decline 
in fertility rates, but only up to a certain stage of economic development.  From a certain GDP 
level on, further economic development is found to stimulate a slight increase in fertility rates, 
even once  controlled for birth  postponement  (Myrskyla  et  al.,  2009;  Luci  and Thévenon, 
2010). Economic development only partially explains cross-country differences in fertility 
trends, however, since countries with comparable GDP per capita levels often have different 
fertility levels. Luci and Thévenon (2010) show that the fertility rebound has been steeper in 
those highly developed countries where women’s labour market participation has also risen 
significantly. This suggests that the impact of economic development per se is small, unless 
accompanied by better opportunities for women to combine work with family life (Ahn and 
Mira, 2002; D’Addio and Mira d’Ercole 2005; Luci and Thévenon, 2010; OECD, 2011). In 
this context, four groups of main factors intersect with economic development that are likely 
to  explain cross-country variations in fertility trends.  
First, family policy instruments, that provide parents with cash and in-kind resources or with 
time to care for children, are likely to influence fertility by supporting families’ well-being 
and  parents’  work-life  balance.  Financial  transfers  might  influence  the  decision  to  have 
children if these transfers reduce sufficiently the direct “monetary” cost of raising children 
(Becker, 1965). Nonetheless, support that enables working parents to combine work with 
childbirth might also have a high impact since it helps to reduce the opportunity costs of 
children that occur when parents, and especially women, have to leave paid work to raise 
children  (Willis,  1973;  Hotz  et  al.,  1997).  Employment-protected  leave  entitlements  after 
childbirth and childcare services to substitute for parental care are institutional factors that are 
intended to make children less costly. The evidence of the effectiveness of these family policy 
instruments is relatively weak, however (for a survey, see Sleebos, 2003; Gauthier, 2007; 
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Second,  labour  market  characteristics  represent  an  important  dimension  of  the  context  in 
which fertility decisions are embedded. Childbearing is often conditional upon the acquisition 
of a stable and secure position in the labour market (Blossfeld et al. 2005).In that context, 
fertility  trends  are  likely  to  respond  to  unemployment  rates  or  to  the  development  of 
temporary work that makes labour market status relatively insecure (Adsera 2004, 2011). By 
contrast,  the  guarantees  offered  by  either  civil  servant  status  or  the  legislation  protecting 
employees against dismissal offer some financial security and a capacity to plan for the future 
that may have a positive influence on fertility (Sobotka, 2004;  Koblas, 2011). It is likely, 
however, that these protections  only  benefit a  minority of households  in  countries  where 
labour market segmentation remains quite high. In this case, a high degree of employment 
protection  can  indicate  strong  labour  market  dualization  (insiders  vs.  outsiders),  which 
discourages fertility intentions of the unemployed and of people in precarious employment 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999; Sobotka et al., 2011).  
Third, social norms also play a key role in shaping preferences regarding childrearing, timing 
of births and gender roles (Lesthaeghe 2010; Liefbroer and Merz 2010; Koblas, 2011). Norms 
are not fixed, however, and attitudes to childrearing and the gender division of work have 
been  changing  considerably  over  the  past  decades  (Lesthaeghe,  2010).  The  decrease  in 
marriage rates, and the increase in divorce and in non-marital births are clear markers of these 
changes. However, the extent to which they have affected fertility rates is not clear-cut. The 
influence of norms is very likely to change over time, as norms themselves evolve.  Such 
changes are illustrated by the experience of southern European countries, where the decrease 
in fertility rates was initially slow but then accelerated more rapidly than in other European 
countries (Kohler et al., 2002). The “resilience” of traditional family norms was initially seen 
as a key factor that “protected” these countries against fertility decline. However, southern 
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fertility rates at a time when traditional norms seemed to lose their prescriptive power and 
clashed  with  women’s  increasing  labour  market  participation  (Laestheghe,  2010).  More 
recently,  the  increase  in  non-marital  births  seems  to  signal  a  greater  acceptance  of  non-
standard  childbearing  patterns  in  many  OECD  countries.  However,  there  are  large  cross-
country differences. The share of non-marital births remains low in Japan, Korea or Greece, 
while births outside marriage represent over half of total births in Estonia, France, Norway, 
Mexico, Slovenia and Sweden (OECD, 2011). 
The  above  trends  suggest  that  increases  in  women’s  educational  attainment,  in  women’s 
labour market participation and in women’s earnings have been key drivers of fertility trends. 
Women’s “economic empowerment” thus emerges as a forth important factor for fertility. 
This “empowerment” of women has already been identified as one cause of the postponement 
of family formation (Blossfeld, 1995), and was cited as the key explanation for the decrease 
in fertility rates in developed countries from the early 1970s to the late 1990s (Hotz et al., 
1997). In this context, fertility trends are more and more likely to depend on the extent to 
which policies help households to bear the cost of raising children and to combine work and 
family life rather than urging parents, and especially women, to choose between children and 
career development. The timing of births is also key in the decision-making since the period 
at  which  potential  parents  give  birth  impact  their  ability  the  bear  both  the  direct  and 
opportunity costs of children. High cost of children are likely to encourage potential parents 
to first establish a stable position in the labour market and to wait until they get higher income 
before  starting  a  family.  Thus,  family  policies  are  likely  to  curb  the  postponement  of 
childbirths  by  raising  opportunities  to  earn  a  salary  and  to  combine  work  and  family. 
Consequences on the total number of children in completed families is more uncertain and 
would  certainly  depend  on  the  comprehensiveness  of  policies,  e.g.  the  complementarity 
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support as children age in order to cover childrearing and education costs might also be key 
parameter of policies to influence fertility decision. 
Against  this  background,  this  paper  assesses  the  very  important  issue  of  the  potential 
contribution of family policies to cross-national variations in fertility trends. The effect on 
fertility trends of paid leave entitlements, childcare services and financial transfers to families 
is analysed for the first time by putting together data on multiple policies for a large set of 
countries and for an almost three decade time period. Our analysis is based on observations of 
18 OECD countries covering the years 1980 to 2007.  
Our contribution is fourfold. First, we extend previous findings by considering three main 
types of policy instruments (cash transfers, parental leave and childcare), whereas former 
studies mostly concentrate on only one or two aspects. Spending in-cash is divided in two sets 
to identify separately the support granted around childbirth and those which flows to cover the 
later cost of raising children. Child care is divided in measures for spending and coverage.  
Thus, analyse the influence of the mix of different types of family support that supposedly 
respond  to  families’  needs  for  time,  money  and  services  at  childbirth  and  during  the 
childrearing period.  
Second,  we  update  previous  results  by  focusing  on  a  time  period  that  covers  the  recent 
upswing in fertility rates. A key issue is thus the extent to which policies have contributed to 
this reversal of fertility trends.  
Third, we apply panel data estimation methods that allow addressing several methodological 
problems.  We  disentangle  the  “causal”  impact  of  policy  changes  from  country-constant 
characteristics  that  may  affect  fertility  levels  by  indentifying  within-country  variations. 
Instrumenting current policies with lagged observations serve as robustness checks to control 
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endogeneity of explanatory variables. Efforts are also made to filter out the possible effect of 
birth postponement on fertility trends.  
Forth, we reconcile our results with those of previous studies. Therefore, we compare our 
findings to those of recent studies providing estimations of the impact of family policies on 
fertility trends of economically advanced countries. 
The first section sheds light on cross-national differences in family support policies since the 
early 1980s. Particular attention is paid to how policies have developed over the period and to 
the extent of the support package provided to working parents with children below school 
age. The second section presents our empirical strategy, before introducing our results. The 
last section discusses our results in the light of those already established in the literature.  
I.  Family policies and fertility in OECD countries: data and trends 
I.1. Increasing investments for families 
A range of family policies exist that may influence the resources of different household types. These 
include tax benefits and cash transfers, childcare arrangements, and leave provision. The deployment 
of family policy instruments varies with each country’s approach to policy objectives, which do not 
necessarily refer to fertility issues (Thévenon 2011a; OECD 2011). Nevertheless, global spending 
for families with children has been considerably increased over the past three decades in most 
OECD countries as a result of growing concerns from governments about families’ well-being 
and  work  and  family  reconciliation.  Figure  1  shows  that  the  share  of  GDP  spent  by 
governments for families – disregarding expenditures on compulsory education – rose from 
an average of around 1.6% in 1980 to 2.0-2.4% in 2007 in the OECD. Yet, cross-country 
differences in the total amount transferred to families remain large, with Denmark, France, 
Iceland and the United Kingdom spending over 3.5 % of GDP for families, compared with 
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Figure 1: Public spending on families 
% of GDP, 1980-2007 
 
Note: Countries are ranked in decreasing order of total family benefit spending in 2007. Expenditure includes child payments 
and allowances, parental leave benefits and childcare support (e.g. spending in childcare and preschool services for children 
under school age). Spending on health and housing support also assists families, but is not included here. For additional details, 
see data source. 
Data source: OECD Family Data Base (2011) 
 
I.2. Financial transfers 
The breakdown of spending into broad categories of policy instruments also varies greatly 
across countries. Financial support can be provided in the form of cash benefits or child-
related tax advantages. Cash benefits are twofold: some are paid out after a birth, in the form 
of birth grants or payments to parents who take leave from employment after a birth. Other 
benefits are received by parents on a regular basis. They mainly include family allowances, 
child benefits or working family payments. A number of OECD countries also include one-off 
benefits such as back-to-school-supplements or social grants (for housing for instance) in this 
category.  Overall,  cash  payments  are  often  the  main  group  of  expenditures,  representing 
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The  amounts  spent  for  each  child  relative  to  GDP  per  capita  provide  a  more  accurate 
comparison  of  countries’  efforts  to  support  families.  Figure  2  shows  variations  in  these 
amounts rated for children under age 20 (excluding benefits received for childbirth or leave 
payments).  Interestingly, two English-speaking countries  appear in  opposite positions: the 
United Kingdom, on the one hand, shows the highest cash expenditure per child, while the 
United States ranks at the bottom end, together with Korea. Even though the average amounts 
spent  per  child  increased  between  1980  and  2007,  expenditure  has  decreased  in  several 
countries over the past decades. More precisely, average spending has decreased in about one 
third of countries since the mid-1990s. 
Figure 2: Spending on cash benefits per child under age 20 
































Data source: OECD Family Data Base (2011) 
 
Child-related tax breaks are also quite widespread among OECD countries. Only 6 out of 32 
OECD countries do not grant any specific tax deductions to families. Tax-related transfers for 
families include tax allowances on earned income, tax credits or tax deductions for services 
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relative importance in overall support to families varies quite widely (Figure 1). They are the 
main levy to support families in the United States and represent a large share of the overall 
money transferred to families in France and Germany.  
I.3. Child-related leave-entitlements 
Leave entitlement after childbirth is a second broad category of parental support. Employment 
is protected during leave, so that parents can resume work after taking time off to care for a 
newborn infant. Different types of leave entitlement can often be combined. First, working 
mothers are entitled to a period of maternity leave (or pregnancy leave) around the time of 
childbirth which protects the health of the working mother and her children and guarantees 
that she can return to her job within a limited number of weeks after childbirth.  The average 
duration of maternity leave in 2007 was around 19 weeks across the OECD. Maternity leave 
is paid in almost all cases, except in Australia and the United States where there is no central 
government legislation on paid leave (See OECD, 2011, indicator PF2.1 for details).
1 Fathers 
are also entitled to specific paternal leave at the time of childbirth, but these entitlements 
cover a short period that varies from 5 to 15 days following the birth. 
There are larger variations in parental leave entitlements supplementing the basic rights to 
maternity and paternity leave across the OECD countries. Employed parents are entitled to 
additional weeks of “parental” and/or “childcare” leave if they want to continue caring for 
their child beyond the standard period of maternity or paternity leave. These weeks of parental 
leave are usually taken just after maternity leave, though in some countries they can be taken 
much later during childhood (often before the child reaches age 8).  
Parental leave payment (all sorts of publicly paid parental leave and birth grants) is a key 
determinant of parental leave uptake. However, as leave payments do not fully replace the 
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leave-taker's salary, and since women very often earn less than their partners, they are more 
likely than men to take all or the majority of the leave entitlement. Moreover, women most 
often do so to care for an infant after the end of their maternity leave. In this case, their 
absence from work may extend over a long period. Thus, for women who were employed 
before childbirth, the associated opportunity cost of a child due to work interruption becomes 
quite high. Figure 3 ads paid weeks of parental leave to those of maternity leave entitlements, 
and shows that women can be out of work for 3 years or more in 6 countries (Austria, the 
Czech Republic, Finland, France for the birth of a second child, Hungary and the Slovak 
Republic). Total periods of paid leave are much shorter, 1 year or less in the other countries, 
because  periods  of  paid  parental  leave  are  shorter.  Differences  in  payment  rates  across 
countries are not reported here, although they are a key parameter of the actual use of leave 
entitlements and of the associated spending by governments.  
Figure 3 : Childbirth-related leave 













































2006 for Italy, 2004 for Portugal. Countries are ranked by number of paid weeks available in 1980. Weeks of maternity and of 
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Panel B: Spending on child-related leave per birth in % of GDP per capita 
 
Data source: OECD Family Data Base (2011) 
 
These differences in duration and payment conditions lead to substantial variations in the 
amounts of public transfers spent per child, as illustrated in Figure 3 Panel B. These amounts 
include the “birth grants” paid in some countries to cover expenses associated with childbirth. 
Spending  per  birth  relative  to  GDP  per  capita  is  especially  high  in  Czech  Republic  and 
Hungary where the parental leave period is comparatively long.  
I.4. Childcare services 
Finally, childcare services that parents can substitute for personal care are also resources that 
might  influence  the  decision  to  have  children  and  to  combine  work  and  childbearing. 
Governments play a key role in subsidizing the provision of childcare services, and trends 
over the past two decades show that some OECD countries have favoured expansions in in-
kind  benefits  compared  to  cash  transfers  and  education  spending  (OECD,  2011). 
Nevertheless, at almost 0.9% of GDP on average in the OECD, in-kind expenditures for pre-
school children still represents no more than 1/3 of the total expenditures for families (Figure 
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kind expenditures of over 2% of GDP in total, e.g. more than twice the OECD average. 
Denmark, Italy and Sweden are also the three countries with highest expenditures per child 
under age 3 relative to GDP per capita (Figure 4 Panel A). 
Figure 4: Childcare services for children under age 3  
Panel A: Spending on childcare services per child in % of GDP per capita   
 
2006 for Portugal.  
Spending includes childcare and day care services, home help for families, and a suite of family social services. 
 
Panel B: Proportion of children enrolled in formal childcare services   
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The expansion of childcare coverage for children below age 3, as illustrated in Figure 4 Panel 
B,  is  one  consequence  of  the  increasing  investment  in  childcare  services.  Differences  in 
coverage are still large, however, between Denmark, where about 2/3 of under-3s have a place 
in daycare centres, and Germany and Austria, which are located at the other extreme. In 
Austria, care services cover only 12% of pre-school children. 
To  sum  up,  OECD  countries  have  considerably  increased  their  investments  to  support 
families over the past decades. All types of support have been expanded to some extent: in-
cash transfers towards families with children have been increased in many countries since the 
early 1980s, but the relative share of GDP per capita invested per child has grown at a slower 
rate since the mid 1990s or decreased in some countries. 
Leave entitlements for working parents have also been extended, but parental leave policies 
vary widely across countries. Overall, two types of leave schemes can be distinguished. First, 
countries  which  were  pioneers  in  introducing  parental  leave  entitlements  provide 
comparatively long periods of leave (up to three years) with flat-rate payments, which make a 
return to the labour market difficult, especially for low qualified women. Second, countries 
where leave entitlements  were introduced later and/or reformed recently  (as  in  Germany) 
offer shorter periods of leave, often combined with earnings-related payments and special 
incentives for fathers to take up parental leave. This second type of leave scheme promotes a 
combination of work and family life for both parents and encourages mothers to participate in 
the labour market. Overall, a polarization between countries can be observed between the two 
leave schemes over time. Only Germany has radically changed its leave policy scheme from 
the first to the second type, resulting in a drastic reduction in the number of paid leave weeks 
from 2007 on (a period not covered in the present study). 
Last but not least, “in-kind” investments have increased considerably over the last decade as a 
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investments is the large increase in the coverage of childcare services for infants and pre-
school children. The percentage of under-3s enrolled in formal childcare services still varies 
widely, however, and is particularly low in German-speaking countries.  
Overall, remarkable differences still exist across countries in the way policy instruments are 
combined to provide support to families. Differences especially concern the extent and form 
of support provided to working parents with children under age three (Thévenon, 2011a). In 
that respect, Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) outdistance 
the other OECD countries, providing comprehensive support to working parents with very 
young  children  (below  3  years  of  age).  English-speaking  countries  (Australia,  Canada, 
Ireland, United Kingdom New Zealand, and the United States) provide much less in-time and 
in-kind  support  to  working  parents  with  very  young  children,  while  financial  support  is 
greater  but  very  much  targeted  on  low-income  and  focused  on  preschool  aged  children. 
Continental and Eastern European countries form a more heterogeneous group with a more 
intermediate  position.  Two  exceptions  are  France  and  Hungary,  which  provide  relatively 
generous support for working parents compared with other countries of this group. 
Figure 5 shows variations in fertility trends across OECD countries since the early 1980s. A 
steep decline can be observed in Japan, Korea, the German-speaking countries and in South 
European countries, which all continue to  face a situation of low fertility. By contrast,  a 
significant  re-increase  in  fertility  rates  occurred  in  countries  of  Continental  and  Nordic 
Europe, as in English-speaking countries. Figure 5 also shows that in parallel to the fertility 
re-increase in several OECD countries, the average public expenditures for families in OECD 
countries have increased over the same period. An acceleration of this rise started a bit earlier 








































2  18 
family policies has played a role for the upturn of fertility. In the following, we empirically 
assess the influence of these policies on fertility trends in OECD countries. 
Figure 5: Total fertility rates and average government spending for families 
 
TFR (left-hand side scale) and public spending (right-hand side scale) 
 
Geographical areas are defined as follows: Anglophone (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States); 
Nordic  (Denmark,  Finland,  Norway,  Sweden);  Continental  (Belgium,  France,  Netherlands);  German-speaking  (Austria, 
Germany); Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain). Government spending per child includes expenditures on family benefits, 
childcare services, leave and other payments made around childbirths. The average is calculated for 18 countries for which data 
are  available,  including  Denmark,  Netherlands,  Spain,  Norway,  Sweden,  Portugal,  France,  New  Zealand,  Belgium,  United 
States, Italy, Japan, Australia, United Kingdom, Ireland, Finland, Germany, Austria. 
 
II. Empirical Procedure 
 
To estimate the impact of family policies on fertility trends in developed countries, we use 
five family policy measures as exogenous variables in our empirical analysis. Policy variables 
were constructed for 18 OECD countries
2, for which information is available over the years 
1982 to 2007. Three of the five family policy variables measure public expenditure per child. 
The two firsts relates to benefits paid to families, divided in two categories to separate the 
support granted around childbirth from those received at a later stage:  
 
                                                 
2 Denmark, Netherlands, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, France, New Zealand, Belgium, United States,  Italy, Japan, 
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  Spending  per  birth  (in  %  of  GDP  per  capita),  including  maternity,  paternity  and 
parental leave benefits  as well as birth grants  
  Spending on cash  benefits  per  child under age  20 (in % of GDP per  capita) (tax 
transfers and spending for childbirth not included)  
  Spending on childcare services per child under age three (in % of GDP per capita) 
Two further family policy variables are used to capture leave and childcare policies: 
  The number of paid leave weeks, adding maternity leave weeks and the number of 
parental leave weeks women are entitled to take after maternity leave per se 
  Childcare enrolment of children under age 3 (as a percentage of the total number of 
children of this age group) 
For most of our empirical analysis, we use total fertility rates (TFR) as endogenous variable. 
The  TFR  by  year  and  country  is  the  best  available  measure  to  compare  fertility  trends 
between countries. However, total fertility rates are likely to be biased measures of fertility, as 
they are sensitive to changes in the mean age of women at childbearing. Birth postponement 
is likely to decrease this period measure even if the completed family size stays unchanged. 
In order to control for changes in the timing of childbirth, we use tempo-adjusted total fertility 
rates (adjTFR) besides general TFR as endogenous variable. The tempo-adjusted fertility rate 
is intended to measure fertility levels within a given period in the absence of postponement 
(Bongaarts and Feeney, 1988; Sobotka, 2004). By weighting TFR by changes in women’s 
mean age  at  childbirth,  this  adjusted measurement  focuses on the quantum-component of 
fertility changes. However, adjTFR only corresponds to a pure quantum measure of fertility 
on the assumption of uniform postponement of all stages, i.e. an absence of cohort effects 
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We  empirically  test  with  linear  regressions  whether  our  family  policy  variables  it p   are 
associated with fertility response variables  it f  while controlling for potential side effects.  
We run regressions as: 
 
it it p f * it t i it T X ' '           
 
 
We  use  information  at  the  country  level  (i)  as  well  as  on  the  time  period  level  (t).  Xit 
represents  the  set  of  control  variables.  Tt  stands  for  period-specific  fixed-effect,  istands 
alternatively for country random or country fixed -effects, and  it  for country and time -
specific random shocks. We are interested in testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient   
is zero at a statistical significance level of 5%.  If the null hypothesis is rejected, it is 
reasonable to infer that the policy measure does matter for fertility. 
We  start  with  a  pooled  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  regression.  To  deal  with 
heteroscedasticity, we use pooled OLS with robust standard errors3. Linear time trends are 
included (while eliminating the constant in the regression model) to capture year-specific 
shocks of fertility rates. These time-specific fertility trends risk biasing the estimated impact 
of family policies on fertility, for example if policies are especially extended when fertility is 
decreasing rapidly. It is also possible that family policies are extended when fertility is high, 
in order to support the households’ standard of living and to increase the opportunities for 
women to combine work and family. However, three of our policy variables are measures of 
public expenditure per child, which implies that these measures are –a priori- not affected by increases 
in fertility.  
                                                 
3 We also use a bootstrap with 1 000 replications, which computes a bias-corrected and accelerated 95 per cent confidence 
interval of the OLS-coefficients. In addition, we use OLS with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (hc3 robust standard 
errors). We find no change in the coefficients’ significance in comparison to results obtained by the OLS estimation with robust 
standard errors. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that it is almost impossible to entirely rule out the problem of obtaining biased 
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We  apply,  none  the  less,  a  series  of  panel  data  methods  to  reduce  the  possible  risk  of 
obtaining biased estimators  due to  inverse causality between fertility and family policies. 
First, we distinguish between within- and between-country variations in order to identify a 
causal  effect  of  policy  settings  on  fertility.    We  identify  between-country  variations  by 
performing  a  Between  Effects  estimator  (BE),  which  is  based  on  time  averages  of  each 
variable for each country, and we identify within-country variations by performing a Fixed 
Effects  estimator  (FE).  A  simple  FE  estimator  performs  regressions  in  deviations  from 
country  means.  Due  to  this  differencing  process,  the  FE  estimator  eliminates  unobserved 
country-specific  variables  that  are  constant  over  time  and  therefore  reduces  the  risk  of 
obtaining an omitted variable bias (OVB). The differencing process obtains the same results 
as when introducing country-specific dummy variables.
4 We also use a two-way Fixed Effects 
model that combines country-specific dummy variables with time dummies and therefore 
controls for country-fixed and time-fixed effects. This procedure allows to not only to control 
for  country-fixed-effects,  but  also  for  time -shocks,  which  again  reduces,  but  does  not 
eliminate  the  problem  of  o btaining  biased  estimates  due  to  unobserved  variables.  By 
disentangling the impact of policy changes  over time from country-constant characteristics 
that affect fertility levels, the FE estimator  allows us to disentangle the impact of policy 
changes over time from country-constant characteristics that affect fertility levels . The FE 
estimator therefore reduces potential endogeneity problems. 
To further address endogeneity, we estimate the impact of family policies on fertility in a 
dynamic setting in the following step. We perform an IV-regression in two steps (Two Stage 
                                                 
4 We compare the fixed effects model to a random effects (RE) model, which captures both within and between-country 
variation. The RE estimator subtracts a fraction of averages from each corresponding variable and therefore also controls for 
unobserved country heterogeneity. If the number of observations is large, the RE model is more efficient than the OLS and 
the FE model, but only on the assumption that the unobserved effects are uncorrelated with the error term. If this is the case, 
unobserved country-specific variables that are constant over time are captured by an additional residual and the estimators are 
unbiased and asymptotically consistent. We use a Hausman (1978) test to  invalidate the hypothesis that the unobserved 
country effects are not correlated with the error term in the RE model. For our data, the fixed effect specification is superior 
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Least  Squares  Estimator)  by  using  time-lagged  observations  of  the  five  family  policy 
variables as instruments for current observations of these variables. We also introduce our 
exogenous policy variables as lags in the Fixed Effects model. The use of lagged exogenous 
variables by the 2SLS and FE estimator lessens the risk of obtaining biased and inconsistent 
estimators due to inverse causality between the endogenous and the exogenous variables. For 
example, it is not possible for TFR observed in 2007 to impact child care expenditure in 2004. 
On the other hand, it is likely that variations in fertility resulting from changes in child care 
expenditure appear time-lagged. Moreover, we account for the fact that the impact of family 
policies on fertility is likely to depend on the fertility level at the starting point, as assumed, 
for example, by Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) and D’Addio and Mira d’Ercole (2005). We 
obtain  this  control  for  the  “dynamics  of  adjustment”  by  introducing  lagged  levels  of  the 
endogenous variable, i.e. our fertility measure, among the exogenous variables in the 2SLS 
and FE model. 
However,  the  use  of  time-lagged  variables  represents  only  a  “second  best”  option  for 
controlling  for  endogeneity,  as  this  procedure  can  not  completely  rule  out  a  potential 
estimation  bias  caused  by  inverse  causality.  The  best  option  would  be  to  substitute  each 
family policy variable by a proper instrumental variable that is highly correlated with the 
family  policy  variable  but  not  correlated  with  fertility.  As  variables  which  meet  these 
requirements are not available, we put up with lagged observations as instruments for current 
policy  observations.  At  the  same  time,  the  use  of  lagged  exogenous  variables  allows  to 
account  for  possible  time  delays  of  fertility  responses  to  policy  changes.  We  therefore 
estimate our models with one, three and five-year lags to see in how far the timing of policy 
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Further controls for time-constant omitted variables and for time trends are made by applying 
a First-Difference Estimator
5. In addition, we apply a System GMM estimation to combine 
controls for omitted variable bias (OVB), non-stationarity, endogeneity and for dynamics of 
adjustment. We do not present FDE and GMM results as these models are less appropriate for 
our empirical analysis than the Fixed Effects models. We identify the two way-FE model as 
the most appropriate estimation model for the purpose of our analysis. 
Finally, we introduce control variables into  the two way-FE model,  as policy settings and 
fertility can also be influenced by the economic and institutional context, which can vary not 
only between countries but also over time.    We start with adding the log of GDP per capita 
(measured at purchasing power parity in constant 2005 US $) and its squared term to the five 
policy  variables.  This  procedure  allows  controlling  for  a  convex  impact  of  economic 
development on fertility, as suggested by  Luci and Thévenon (2010).   In a second step, we 
control for female employment rates (women aged 25 -54). We also add female average 
working hours to compensate for the fact that women’s full-time equivalent employment rates 
are not available for large parts of our sample. We control for these variables, as the measured 
impact of family policies on fertility risks being biased if policies affect female employment 
and women’s working hours, which are correlated with fertility. For the same reason, we add 
unemployment rates (ages 25-54) and a measure for employment protection in a third step, 
which allows controlling for the labour market context. Finally, we add the share of non-
marital births as proxy for changes and differences in gender and family norms.  
The addition of control variables certainly causes multicollinearity problems. A correlation 
between  exogenous  variables  implies  that  interpreting  the  estimated  coefficients  becomes 
difficult, as we cannot ascribe the change of the endogenous variable to a certain determinant. 
                                                 
5 Country-specific variables that are constant over time and time trends are eliminated by using endogenous and exogenous 
variables  as  first  differences.  Regression  diagnostics  (correlogram,  Dickey  Fuller  1979)  suggest  that  all  time  series are 
difference stationary, implying that FDE controls for non-stationarity (spurious regression). However, for our data, the use of 
first differences for the exogenous and endogenous variables causes a high loss of significance for the estimated coefficients 
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However, we are primarily interested in the sign and significance of the estimated coefficient 
of our five policy variables and not in the quantification of the estimated impact of our control 
variables  on  fertility.    As  we  consider  the  economic  context,  women’s  emancipation  and 
societal norms as important factors for fertility, we prefer reducing the risk of an omitted 
variable bias (OVB) by putting up with multicollinearity. At the same time, we abstain from 
introducing further control variables (one might think for example of access to and costs of 
housing and health care as other important determinants of fertility) to not further increase the 
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III.  Regression results 
 
Table 1 shows the regression results for the OLS
6-, country-fixed effects, country- and time-
fixed effects and between effects estimation models. 






Country             
Fixed Effects
Country & Time      
Fixed Effects
Between              
Effects
Regressors:
spending on cash benefits per child (%GDPpc) 0.0300*** 0.0168* 0.0181** 0.0251   
(6.91) (2.25) (2.62) (1.74)   
spending per birth around childbirth(%GDPpc)  0.00216* 0.00348** 0.00681*** 0.00319   
(2.54) (3.04) (6.00) (0.57)   
nb. paid leave weeks -0.00176*** 0.00102** 0.00136*** -0.00209   
(-3.87) (2.81) (4.02) (-0.88)   
enrolment young children (0-2) in childcare 0.00495*** -0.00113 -0.000905 0.00997   
(3.54) (-1.18) (-0.70) (1.00)   
spending on childcare services per child (0-2) (%GDPpc) -0.00145 -0.00244 -0.00228 -0.00593   
(-1.31) (-1.77) (-1.62) (-0.66)   
linear time trends yes yes yes no
country dummies no yes yes no
time dummies no no yes no
constant 1.383***
(7.19)   
N 274 274 274 274
nb. of countries:* 18 18 18 18
time period: 1982-2007 1982-2007 1982-2007 1982-2007
R²: 0.986 0.996 0.997 0.439   
R² adj.:            0.986                      
0,345 without time trends 0.996 0.997 0.206   
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Endogenous  variable:
 total fertility rate                                                                                                                                                                                                      
(TFR)
*Denmark, Netherlands, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, France, New Zealand, Belgium, United States, Italy, Japan, Australia, United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Finland, Germany, Austria.  
 
The  results  show  that  the  null-hypothesis  stating  no  impact  of  family  policy  settings  on 
fertility can be rejected for four of our five policy variables.  All four estimation models 
suggest  a  positive  impact  on  fertility  of  income  support  over  childhood,  as  measured  by 
                                                 
6 As regression diagnostics suggest that heteroscedasticity is a possible issue in our data, we also use the OLS estimator with 
“heteroscedasticity-consistent” standard errors. Compared to the regression results of column 1, the use of heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors changes the t-statistics only marginally and leaves the estimated coefficients and their significance 
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spending on cash benefits per child
7. This is also the case for spending per birth  around 
childbirth (leave and birth grants).  
In contrast to the FE regressions, both the OLS and the  BE results suggest a  negative impact 
of the  number of paid leave weeks and a positive impact of  childcare enrolment on total 
fertility rates. In comparison to the OLS results, the coefficients estimated by the BE model 
keep their sign, but they all lose significance. At the same time, the goodness of fit increases 
from 36% to 44% when comparing the OLS model (without linear time trends, results not 
shown here) to the BE model, whereas the adjusted R² decreases from 35% to 21%. Adjusted 
R² represents a corrective for R², becaus e R² automatically increases with the number of  
estimated coefficients (i.e. the number of  exogenous variables in the estimation equation). 
Adjusted R² penalizes an addition of explanatory variables if they have no real explanatory 
power. This is the case for our policy variables when focussing on between-country variation 
only. The lost significance of the estimated coefficients, the increasing R² and the decreasing 
adjusted R² indicate that country-specific effects explain most of the fertility variance i n the 
Between Effects model, while between-country differences of family policies are relatively 
small. Therefore, we consider the BE model as not appropriate for our empirical analysis. 
The  Fixed  Effects  model,  which  focuses on  within -country  variation,  shows significant 
coefficients for three policy variables (spending on cash benefits per child, spending per child 
around childbirth, number of paid leave weeks) . The significant coefficients confirm that 
within-country differences of these family policy instruments are larger than between-country 
differences between these policies. This suggests that  fertility variations in our sample are 
mainly due to changes in the family policy setting over time.  
                                                 
7 We also use an alternative variable which measures income from child benefits including tax allowances for a single-earner 
couple earning 100% of average earnings. We find a significantly positive impact of this expenditure measure on fertility. 
However, this variable is only available for a limited number of countries and time periods, and the significance is reduced in 
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The OLS estimation, which captures both within-and between-country variations, shows a 
negative correlation between the number of paid leave weeks  and fertility.  However, this 
negative correlation is likely to emerge due to inverse causality: countries with lowest fertility 
rates have introduced longer leave (or countries have extended paid leave when fertility rates 
were  lower  or  declining).  As  the  FE  model  captures  only  within-country  variations,  this 
model is more appropriate than the OLS or BE model to disentangle the “causal” impact of 
policy changes over time from country-constant characteristics. Therefore, and due to the fact 
that fertility variations are found to be mainly caused by changes in policies over time, we 
consider the FE model as the most appropriate estimation model.  When focussing on within-
country variations (column 2 and 3), the impact of the number of paid leave weeks on fertility 
turns significantly positive whereas childcare enrolment becomes insignificant
8.  
For all models, expenditure on childcare per child has no significant impact on fertility when 
including both childcare variables in the regression at the same time. Regressions not reported 
here show the  both childcare  coefficients do not change in sign and significance when 
including either childcare enrolment or childcare expenditure separately.  
The adjusted coefficient of goodness of fit (R²) for the OLS regression is 0.345 before and 
0.986 after controlling for time effects, suggesting that time effects play an important role for 
fertility in our data base. This supports our int ention to take time effects more fully into 
account in the following step.  
Table 2 presents  therefore regression results with one-year lagged endogenous variables as 
well as with a one-year lagged endogenous variable among the exogenous variables. These 
dynamic settings allow accounting for time lagged reactions of fertility to policy changes as 
well as for potential endogeneity and for dynamics of adjustment.  Column 1 and 3 present a 
                                                 
8 Moreover, FE-coefficients of childcare enrolment are likely to be negative because of the strong correlation of 
this variable with female employment – the developement of childcare services being largely induced by raising 
female employment – which has a negative influence on fertility trends (table 3). The negative FE- sign for 
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2SLS- and a FE-model with lagged exogenous variables. In column 2 and 4, lagged levels of 
the endogenous variable are added to the exogenous variables for both estimation models. 




Type of regression: 2SLS
2SLS            
dynamic





[spending on cash benefits per child (%GDPpc)]  t-1 0.0353*** 0.00254*   0.0168* -0.00326   
(8.14) (2.42)    (2.18) (-1.13)   
[spending per birth around childbirth(%GDPpc)]  t-1 0.00217* -0.000788**  0.00240* -0.000594   
(1.99) (-3.28)    (2.05) (-1.35)   
[nb. paid leave weeks] t-1 -0.00188*** 0.0000374    0.000791* 0.00000249   
(-5.07) (0.44)    (2.07) (0.02)   
[enrolment young children (0-2) in childcare]  t-1 0.00470*** 0.000493    -0.000477 0.000906*  
(3.44) (1.63)    (-0.48) (2.46)   
[spending on childcare services  per child (0-2) (%GDPpc)]  t-1 -0.000637 0.00119*** -0.0000481 0.00175***
(-0.39) (3.38)    (-0.04) (3.50)   
[TFR]  t-1 0.970*** 0.887***
(70.17)    (38.49)   
constant 1.328*** 0.0173    1.420*** 0.166***
(40.51) (0.87)    (30.33) (4.50)   
N 250 250 259 259
nb. of countries:* 18 18 18 18
time period: 1982-2007 1982-2007 1982-2007 1982-2007
R²: 0.402 0.972 0.095 0.876   
R² adj.: 0.39 0.971 0.011 0.864   
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Endogenous  variable:
 total fertility rate                                                                                                                                                                                                      
(TFR)
*Denmark, Netherlands, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, France, New Zealand, Belgium, United States, Italy, Japan, Australia, United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Finland, Germany, Austria.  
 
With 39%, the adjusted goodness of fit of the 2SLS model with one-year lagged exogenous 
variables as instruments for current policy observations (column 1, table 2)  is somewhat 
higher than the goodness of fit of the standard OLS  regression (column 1, table 1: 34,5%). 
This suggests that fertility reacts in a time-delayed manner to changes in the policy setting. 
Increasing the time lag of the instruments (from one to three as well as to five years) further 
increases the goodness of fit of the 2SLS model (results available on request). This implies 
that the time-delay of the fertility response tends to exceed one year, which is rather intuitive 
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The signs of the 2SLS results of table 2 differ only from the OLS results in table 1 when 
controlling for the dynamics of adjustment (column 2).  In this case, the estimated coefficient 
of  spending  per  birth  (leave  and  birth  grants)  becomes  significantly  negative,  while  the 
estimated coefficient of childcare expenditure per birth becomes significantly positive. The 
control for the dynamics of adjustment in addition to lagged exogenous variables in the FE 
model (column 4) leads to the result that both coefficients for childcare enrolment and for 
childcare expenditure per child turn significantly positive. These sign changes underline the 
importance for the dynamics of adjustment for fertility, suggesting that the influence of actual 
family policies on fertility depends on previous fertility levels. It is likely, for example, that if 
fertility is high, countries tend to provide relatively high levels of investments in childcare per 
child, because there is a societal demand for child care quality.  Yet overall, we observe that 
the introduction of lagged fertility among the exogenous variables makes up for a very large 
proportion  of  variations  of  the  endogenous  variable,  which  is  at  the  expense  of  the 
informative value of our model intending to capture the impact of family policies on fertility. 
This is why we decide to continue our estimations without controlling for the dynamics of 
adjustment. Furthermore, we observe that the goodness of fit of the FE model is poor in 
comparison to the 2SLS model, especially when dynamics of adjustments are not taken into 
account. This indicates that unobserved country-specific variables do play an important role 
for fertility variations, which are captured by the 2SLS but not by the FE model.  This reveals 
the necessity of adding further control variables to the FE model.  
Table 3 shows the regression results of two-way FE estimations (country- and time-fixed 
effects) with standard robust errors and with several control variables. These control variables 
account for main factors of fertility besides family policies (economic development, women’s 
emancipation, the labour market context, societal norms). We hereby return to our “static” 
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tempo-adjusted  fertility  rates  as  endogenous  variable  to  control  for  birth  postponement 
effects.  





















spending on cash benefits per child (%GDPpc) 0.0248*** 0.0197*** 0.0188*** 0.0187** 0.0358*** 0.0875*** 0.0674***
(3.55) (3.57) (3.62) (2.84) (5.56) (6.92) (6.20)   
spending per birth around childbirth (%GDPpc)  0.00548*** 0.00264** 0.00228** 0.00217* 0.00205* 0.000563 -0.000646   
(4.83)    (2.97) (2.99) (2.48) (2.09) (0.45) (-0.68)   
nb. paid leave weeks 0.000931***  0.000734*** 0.000671*** 0.000604*** 0.000571** 0.000514 -0.0000351   
(4.49)    (4.61) (4.22) (3.64) (3.17) (0.74) (-0.08)   
enrolment young children (0-2) in childcare 0.00289*   0.00403*** 0.00213 0.00252* 0.00541*** -0.00539*** 0.000943   
(2.38)    (3.33) (1.78) (2.06) (5.12) (-3.41) (0.64)   
spending on childcare services per child (0-2) (%GDPpc) 0.00184    0.00153 0.00301* 0.00164 -0.00212 -0.0152*** -0.00513** 
(1.37)    (1.24) (2.61) (1.36) (-1.62) (-6.45) (-3.03)   
ln(GDP per capita) -24.04***
(-5.61)   
ln(GDP per capita)² 1.176***
(5.48)   
female employment rate (25-54) -0.0131*** -0.0186*** -0.0108*** -0.0198*** -0.0184***
(-4.678) (-3.77) (-3.74) (-7.23) (-5.72)   
women's avr. working hours  0.0000182 -0.000298 0.0000656 0.000239 0.0000351   
(0.09) (-1.58) (0.34) (0.90) (0.17)   
unemployment rate (25-54) -0.0181***
(-4.89)
labour market protection 0.0145
(0.81)
share of out-of-wedlock births 0.0124***
(5.01)
linear time trends, country and time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 274 228 228 222 191 161 120








time period: 1982-2007 1982-2007 1982-2007 1982-2007 1982-2007 1982-2007 1982-2007
R²: 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.999
R² adj.: 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.999
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
4 Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, USA
5 Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
3 Australia, Astria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
Endogenous  variable: tempo adj.  TFR
2 Australia, Astria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK
 total fertility rate                                                                                                                                                                                                      
(TFR)




The first column of table 3 shows that all policy variables including childcare enrolment have 
a  positive  impact  on  total  fertility  rates   when  controlling  for  econo mic  development. 
Furthermore, the impact of economic development on fertility turns out to be convex  – a 
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capita  and its square can not be interpreted separately. The positive coefficient of ln(GDP per 
capita)²  implies  that  the  second  deviation  of  the  estimation  equation  is  positive,  which 
confirms an minimum in the association between GDP per capita and TFR. This means that 
an increase of GDP per capita decreases fertility for small levels of GDP per capita and 
increases  fertility  from  higher  GDP-levels  on.  Adding  GDP  per  capita  to  the  exogenous 
variables makes it, however, impossible to interpret the value of the estimated coefficients of 
all exogenous variables. Three of the four policy variables are spending measures expressed 
as  percentage  of  GDP  per  capita.  This  suggests  the  existence  of  strong  multicollinearity 
between the exogenous variables. For this reason, GDP per capita is not longer included when 
other control variables are added.  
Column 2 of table 3 shows the impact of our five policy variables on TFR when controlling 
for female  employment  in  combination with  women’s  average working hours. All policy 
variables keep their positive coefficient, including childcare enrolment which increases in 
significance.  This suggests that childcare services are important to raise fertility once women 
get into paid work.  
At the same time, female employment is found to be negatively associated with fertility for 
the two-way FE regression, implying that when female employment increases in one country 
over the observed time period, fertility tends to decrease. This suggests a conflict between 
fertility and female employment when there are no policies supporting a combination of work 
and family life. The finding of a positive impact of all family policies including childcare 
measures on fertility shows that countries have the possibility of modifying the association 
between  fertility  and  female  employment  by  providing  policies  that  encourage  women’s 
work-life balance. This becomes evident when comparing the FE- to BE- and OLS-results: 
When estimating the specification of column 2 of table 3 with OLS and BE (not reported 
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enrolment is also positively associated with fertility, suggesting that countries with higher 
female employment have both higher childcare enrolment rates and higher fertility rates.  
The two-way FE-results are similar when controlling for birth postponement by using tempo-
adjusted TFR as endogenous variable. In particular, a positive impact of spending on cash 
benefits is confirmed. Other policy variables are less significant  for tempo-adjusted TFR, 
which is probably due to the fact that policies influence the timing of births more than the 
fertility  “quantum”.  Moreover,  the  use  of  tempo-adjusted  fertility  rates  as  endogenous 
variable leads to an important reduction in the number of observations, as for seven out of 18 
OECD  countries,  this  variable  is  not  available.  As  this  concerns  countries  in  which  the 
fertility rebound has been rather significant over the last years (like France, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Belgium or the UK), estimation results based on tempo adjusted fertility rates 
have only limited explanatory power. 
Overall, our results show that expenditures on families have an upward incidence on fertility 
rates, but their impact varies with the type of spending. The influence of cash benefits spent 
per child over childhood is about seven times larger than the spending made around childbirth 
with  birth  grants  or  parental  leave  benefits.  Fertility  is  raised  at  a  relatively  high  cost, 
however, since an increase of by 25% is needed to raise periodic fertility rates by 0.036 
children per woman on average in the OECD (as given by the coefficient of the simpler model 
in column 2 in table 3). Spending in cash is also the only variable to have a significant impact 
on adjusted-tempo fertility rates above changes in childbirth timing. The increase in payments 
and/or  the  extension  the  duration  of  leave  entitlement  at  childbirth  have  a  much  weaker 
influence, and there is no evidence that they significantly influence fertility “quantum”, as 
measured by the tempo-adjusted fertility rates. The increase of childcare service coverage, 
which  often  accompanies  the  development  of  female  employment,  is  found  to  increase 
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by 15 point of percentage is predicted to increase the TFR by approximately 0.01 children per 
women on average (predicted from coefficient of column 2 in table 3).  
Labour market insecurity, as measured by unemployment, has a significantly negative impact 
on fertility.  This suggests that most households require financial security and a predictable 
future to start a family or to have more children.  
Finally, increases in the share of non-marital births are found to be significantly positively 
correlated with an increase in fertility rates, suggesting that the latter goes hand in hand with a 
broader acceptance of births occurring outside traditional family models.  
IV.  Discussion 
 
How  do  our  results  corroborate  previous  findings?  In  order  to  answer  this  question,  we 
compare  our  findings  to  those  of  recent  cross-national  key  studies  which  provide  some 
assessments of the impact of family policies on fertility trends of economically advanced 
countries. The findings of these studies differ for reasons such as the use of different fertility 
indicators and different policy variables as well as different geographical and period coverage. 
Since we use a comprehensive range of policy markers, our results help to understand some of 
the contradictory results that were obtained by former studies. The interpretation of our result 
is limited, however, by the fact that variations in TFR are a consequence of both changes in 
fertility timing and in the total number of children, and tempo-adjusted fertility rates provide 
debatable estimates of variations in fertility “levels”. Comparing our results to those of other 
studies using other measures gives a clearer picture of the scope and limits of our own results. 
By doing so, some general conclusions on policy effectiveness can be drawn.  
Table 4 summarises the key results of the most recent cross-national studies analyzing the 
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and childcare
9. Three studies – Gauthier and Hatzius (1997), Adsera (2004) and D’Addio and 
d’Ercole (2005) – are directly comparable to our study as they use the same measure of 
fertility  – total fertility rates. Hilgeman and Butts (2009) use a different fertility measure 
which  is  the  number  of  children  ever  born  for  women  aged  18-45.  Kalwij  (2010)  uses 
retrospective data on fertility history to differentiate the influence of policies on the timing of 
births and completed family size.  
Family policy characteristics are also captured with different indicators. A first difference lies 
in the way the generosity of financial support for families is measured. D’Addio and d’Ercole 
(2005) use the difference in net disposable income of a single earner family with two children 
and  average  earnings  compared  to  those  of  a  childless  household  with  same  earnings  to 
approximate the financial support received by families. This covers family support provided 
by tax allowances as well as by cash benefits (although variations across different household 
types are not accounted for). By contrast, both Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) and Kalwij (2010) 
only consider family cash benefits. Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) measure the generosity of 
family benefits as a percentage of average wages, while Kalwij (2010) considers the average 
amount of public expenditures per child below age 16 for employed women. In our study, we 
use both approaches and obtain similar results for both measures of financial support. 
                                                 
9 The list of key contributions could easily be extended if our aim was to survey the literature, which is beyond the scope of 
the present paper. In general, the evidence suggests that while family benefits do significantly reduce the direct and indirect 
costs of children, their effect on fertility per se is limited. Furthermore, while family benefits have an effect on the timing of 
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Besides  our  study,  three  other  studies  consider  the  duration  of  paid  leave  entitlements 
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Hereby,  D’Addio  and  d’Ercole  (2005)  as  well  as  Gauthier  and  Hatzius  (1997)  consider 
maternity leave only, whereas  our study also  takes  into account  the number of weeks  of 
maternity  and  parental  leave.  Leave  payment  conditions  are  also  assessed  differently: 
replacement rates  during maternity leave are taken into account  by  Gauthier and Hatzius 
(1997) and D’Addio and d’Ercole (2005). Kalwij (2010) considers only the average leave-
related  expenditure  per  child  below  age  one,  while  in  our  study  we  sum  up  the  annual 
expenditures  per  child  for  maternity  and  paternity  leave,  for  parental  leave  and  for  birth 
grants. 
Finally, only 3 studies include information about childcare services. Kalwij (2010) includes 
childcare expenditures (consistently with his expenditure-based approach), while Hilgeman 
and Butts (2009) test the impact on fertility of enrolment of children below age 3 in formal 
childcare. Our study includes both childcare expenditure and enrolment. 
The results of the cited studies are quite diverse but some general conclusions can be drawn. 
The present study as well as Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) and D’Addio and Mira d’Ercole 
(2005) find that cash transfers have a positive effect on fertility. We also find that the average 
amount of cash benefits granted in the period after the year of childbirth has a large positive 
impact on TFR. This impact is confirmed when adjusted-tempo fertility rates are taken into 
account to control for changes in the timing of births, suggesting that these cash benefits 
impact not only the timing of births but also have a quantum effect on fertility. This finding 
contradicts Kalwij (2010), who finds no significant effect of gross public family spending per 
child for European countries, either on the probability of having children or on completed 
family size. 
Results regarding the influence of leave entitlements also vary across studies, which is not 
unexpected  given  the  potentially  ambiguous  effect  that  these  entitlements  can  have  on 
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attachment around the time of childbirth, which has a positive effect on fertility. However, as 
entitlements  are  often  conditional  on  employment,  they  encourage  men  and  women  to 
postpone  childbirth  (which  has  a  negative  effect  on  overall  fertility)  until  they  have 
established themselves in the labour market. This ambiguity is likely to explain the variable 
results reported in Table 5. Similarly to Adsera (2004), we find that an increase in paid leave 
duration has a positive impact on fertility rates. Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) find a similar 
positive but not statistically significant result. Controversely, D’Addio and Mira D’Ercole 
(2005)  find  a  negative  impact,  but  their  model  does  not  control  for  the  development  of 
childcare services for children below 3 years of age. However, leave duration tends to be 
longer in countries where the provision of childcare services, which parents can substitute for 
parental care, is less developed. In these circumstances, it is very likely that the identified 
negative impact of leave duration captures partially the impact of a shortage of childcare 
services  for  very  young  children.    In  all,  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  duration  of  leave 
entitlements increases or decreases fertility, but in any case its effect is small. 
The income received for childbirth in the form of payments associated with leave or birth 
grants also affects fertility behaviour, as pointed out by the different studies. D’Addio and 
Mira d’Ercole (2005) find a positive impact of maternity leave payments on fertility rates, 
Gauthier  and  Hatzius  (1997)  find  an  insignificant  impact.  Our  study,  which  combines  a 
comprehensive measure of different kinds of payments received for childbirth, finds a small 
positive effect of leave payments on fertility. This small influence is likely to illustrate a 
timing effect on childbearing, as suggested by Kalwij (2010) who finds that leave-related 
expenditures impact the timing of births but not completed fertility levels. 
Evidence from cross-country and national studies almost invariably points to a positive effect 
of formal childcare on fertility patterns. Kalwij (2010) finds that childcare subsidies have no 
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and completed family size. Hilgeman and Butts (2009) find a significant effect of childcare 
enrolment  on the total number of children ever born for women aged 18-45 in  the early 
2000s.
10  We also find a strong positive effect of childcare coverage on fertility once we 
control for female employment rates. This highlights the important role of childcare services 
in avoiding a conflict between childbearing and labour market participation for mothers.  
Overall, our results  confirm  that fertility trends depend  crucially  on the opportunities  for 
mothers to combine work and family life. Family policy packages appear as important factors 
to explain why fertility rates are currently and sustainably higher in countries where women 
have  a  larger  access  to  the  labour  market.  The  different  policy  instruments  (paid  leave, 
childcare  services  and  financial  transfers)  are  found  to  have  a  cumulative  influence, 
suggesting that a continuum of support for working parents during early childhood is likely to 
facilitate  parents’  choice  to  have  children.  Nordic  European  countries  and  France  are 
examples of this mix.  
Policy levers do not have similar weight, however. We find that in-cash and in-kind benefits 
covering the first year after childbirth have a larger potential influence on fertility than leave 
entitlements and benefits for childbirth. Furthermore, some OECD countries, such as the US 
for example, do not have comprehensive family policy packages, but still show a fertility 
rebound. This suggests that unobserved country-specific factors still play an important role. 
For example, certain unobserved factors may influence fertility behaviour by enhancing the 
effectiveness  of  family  policy  (Thévenon,  2011b).  These  factors  ensure  that  the  policy 
instruments comprehensively support parents’ work-life balance, for example by avoiding a 
gap in the sequence of support between the expiry of leave entitlements and the provision of 
childcare services, by providing childcare services that match parents’ working hours, or by 
                                                 
10 National studies for Nordic countries corroborate the positive effect of childcare on fertility rates (Rindfuss et al., 2010). 
They also find that reductions in the cost to parents of affordable good-quality childcare can have a substantial effect on 
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guaranteeing a stability of policies over time. In addition, other factors besides family policies 
can also be considered as unobserved factors which are important for fertility, such as specific 
labour market instruments or attitudes towards the role of women and the state. Individual 
response to these factors is likely to vary considerably between as well as within countries 
(Philipov et al., 2009). Whether and how the influence of these macro-level factors varies 
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m me en né ée es s    p pa ar r    l le es s    e em mp pl lo oy ye eu ur rs s    : :    é él la ab bo or ra at ti io on n    d d’ ’u un ne e    t ty yp po ol lo og gi ie e    d de es s    é ét ta ab bl li is ss se em me en nt ts s    d de e   
l l’ ’E En nq qu uê êt te e   F Fa am mi il ll le es s- -E Em mp pl lo oy ye eu ur rs s, ,   2 20 00 09 9, ,   1 14 43 3   p p. .   
N N° °   1 16 60 0. .   – –   G Gé ér ra al ld di in ne e   D DU UT TH HÉ É, ,   R Ra ap ph ha aë ël l   L LA AU UR RE EN NT T, ,   G Gi il ll le es s   P PI IS SO ON N, ,   V Vi iv vr re e   e et t   m mo ou ur ri ir r   a ap pr rè ès s   6 60 0   a an ns s   
e en n    m mi il li ie eu u    r ru ur ra al l    a af fr ri ic ca ai in n. .    I Is so ol le em me en nt t, ,    r re ec co ou ur rs s    a au ux x    s so oi in ns s    e et t    m mo or rt ta al li it té é    d de es s    p pe er rs so on nn ne es s   
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N N° °   1 15 59 9. .   – –   N Na at th ha al li ie e   D DO ON NZ ZE EA AU U   e et t   J Je ea an n- -L Lo ou ui is s   P PA AN N   K KÉ É   S SO ON N, ,   L La a   m mo ob bi il li it té é   r ré és si id de en nt ti ie el ll le e   d de ep pu ui is s   l la a   
f fi in n   d de es s   T Tr re en nt te e   G Gl lo or ri ie eu us se es s, ,   2 20 00 09 9, ,   3 34 4   p p. .   
N N° °   1 15 58 8. .   – –   O Ol li iv vi ie er r   T TH HÉ ÉV VE EN NO ON N, ,   T Th he e   c co os st ts s   o of f   r ra ai is si in ng g   c ch hi il ld dr re en n   a an nd d   t th he e   e ef ff fe ec ct ti iv ve en ne es ss s   o of f   p po ol li ic ci ie es s   
t to o   s su up pp po or rt t   p pa ar re en nt th ho oo od d   i in n   E Eu ur ro op pe ea an n   c co ou un nt tr ri ie es s: :   a a   L Li it te er ra at tu ur re e   R Re ev vi ie ew w   2 20 00 09 9, ,   6 61 12 2   p p. .   
N N° °    1 15 57 7. .    – –    J Je ea an n- -L Lo ou ui is s    P PA AN N    K KÉ É    S SO ON N, ,    L L’ ’é ém me er rg ge en nc ce e    d du u    s se en nt ti im me en nt t    d d’ ’i in ns sé éc cu ur ri it té é    e en n    q qu ua ar rt ti ie er rs s   
d dé éf fa av vo or ri is sé és s. .   D Dé ép pa as ss se em me en nt t   d du u   s se eu ui il l   d de e   t to ol lé ér ra an nc ce e… …   a au ux x   é ét tr ra an ng ge er rs s   o ou u   à à   l la a   m mi is sè èr re e   ? ?, ,   
2 20 00 09 9, ,   2 20 0   p p. .   
N N° °   1 15 56 6. .   – – M Ma ar ry ys se e   M Ma ar rp ps sa at t, ,   T Th he e   I In ne ed d   R Re es se ea ar rc ch h   o on n   H Ho om me el le es ss sn ne es ss s, ,   1 19 99 93 3- -2 20 00 08 8, ,   2 20 00 08 8, ,   2 21 18 8   p p. .      
N N° °    1 15 55 5. .    – –  É Év va a    B BE EA AU UJ JO OU UA AN N, ,    A An nn ne e    S SO OL LA AZ Z, ,    C Ch hi il ld db be ea ar ri in ng g    a af ft te er r    s se ep pa ar ra at ti io on n: :    D Do o    s se ec co on nd d   
u un ni io on ns s   m ma ak ke e   u up p   f fo or r   e ea ar rl li ie er r   m mi is ss si in ng g   b bi ir rt th hs s? ?   E Ev vi id de en nc ce e   f fr ro om m   F Fr ra an nc ce e, ,   2 20 00 08 8, ,   2 24 4   p p. .      
N N° °    1 15 54 4. .    – –  C Ca ar ro ol le e    B BO ON NN NE ET T, ,    L La au ur re en nt t    G GO OB BI IL LL LO ON N, ,    A An nn ne e    L LA AF FE ER RR RÈ ÈR RE E, ,    T Th he e    e ef ff fe ec ct t    o of f   
w wi id do ow wh ho oo od d   o on n   h ho ou us si in ng g   a an nd d   l lo oc ca at ti io on n   c ch ho oi ic ce es s, ,   2 20 00 08 8, ,   4 40 0   p p. .      
N N° °   1 15 53 3. .   – – L Lo ou ui is se e   M MA AR RI IE E   D DI IO OP P- -M MA AE ES S, ,   L La a   p po op pu ul la at ti io on n   a an nc ci ie en nn ne e   d de e   l l’ ’A Af fr ri iq qu ue e   s su ub bs sa ah ha ar ri ie en nn ne e. .   
L Le es s   é él lé ém me en nt ts s   d d’ ’é év va al lu ua at ti io on n, ,   2 20 00 08 8, ,   2 20 0   p p. .      
N N° °   1 15 52 2. .   – – T Tr ra ad du uc ct ti io on n   e en n   R Ru us ss se e   d du u   N N° °   1 12 21 1. .      
N N° °    1 15 51 1. .    – –  P P. .    F FE ES ST TY Y, ,    J J. .    A AC CC CA AR RD DO O, ,    D D. .    D DE EM MA AI IL LL LY Y, ,    L L. .    P PR RO OK KO OF FI IE EV VA A, ,    I I. .   
K KO OR RT TC CH HA AG GI IN NA A, ,    A A. .    S SZ ZU UK KI IE EL LO OJ JC C- -B BI IE EN NK KU UN NS SK KA A, ,    L L. .    N NI IV VO OR RO OZ ZH HK KI IN NA A, ,    L L. .   
O OV VT TC CH HA AR RO OV VA A, ,      
M M. .    S SE EB BT TI I, ,    A A. .    P PA AT TE ER RN NO O, ,    S S. .    S ST TR RO OZ ZZ ZA A, ,    I I. .E EL LI IS SE EE EV VA A, ,    A A. .    S SH HE EV VY YA AK KO OV V, ,   
M Me es su ur re es s, ,   f fo or rm me es s   e et t   f fa ac ct te eu ur rs s   d de e   l la a   p pa au uv vr re et té é. .   A Ap pp pr ro oc ch he es s   c co om mp pa ar ra at ti iv ve e, ,   2 20 00 08 8, ,   1 19 96 6   p p. .      
N N° °   1 15 50 0. .   – –G Gé ér ra al ld di in ne e   D DU UT TH HÉ É, ,   S Se er rg ge e   H H. .   D D. .   F FA AY YE E, ,   E Em mm ma an nu ue el ll le e   G GU UY YA AV VA AR RC CH H, ,   P Pa as sc ca al l   A AR RD DU UI IN N, ,   
M Ma al li ic ck k    A A. .    K KA AN NT TE E, ,    A Al ld di io ou um ma a    D DI IA AL LL LO O, ,    R Ra ap ph ha aë ël l    L LA AU UR RE EN NT T, ,    A Ad da am ma a    M MA AR RR RA A, ,      
G Gi il ll le es s   P PI IS SO ON N, ,   L La a   d dé ét te er rm mi in na at ti io on n   d de es s   c ca au us se es s   d de e   d dé éc cè ès s   p pa ar r   a au ut to op ps si ie e   v ve er rb ba al le e   : :   é ét tu ud de e   d de e   l la a   
m mo or rt ta al li it té é   p pa al lu us st tr re e   e en n   z zo on ne e   r ru ur ra al le e   s sé én né ég ga al la ai is se e, ,   2 20 00 08 8, ,   4 42 2   p p. .      
N N° °   1 14 49 9. .   – –   M Ma ar ry ys se e   M MA AR RP PS SA AT T, ,   S Se er rv vi ic ce es s   f fo or r   t th he e   H Ho om me el le es ss s   i in n   F Fr ra an nc ce e. .   D De es sc cr ri ip pt ti io on n, ,   o of ff fi ic ci ia al l   s st ta at ti is st ti ic cs s, ,   
c cl li ie en nt t   r re ec co or rd di in ng g   o of f   i in nf fo or rm ma at ti io on n. .   A A   r re ep po or rt t   f fo or r   t th he e   E Eu ur ro op pe ea an n   C Co om mm mi is si io on n, ,   2 20 00 07 7, ,   8 84 4   p p. .      
N N° °    1 14 48 8. .    – –    O Ol li iv vi ie er r    T TH HÉ ÉV VE EN NO ON N, ,    L L’ ’a ac ct ti iv vi it té é    f fé ém mi in ni in ne e    a ap pr rè ès s    l l’ ’a ar rr ri iv vé ée e    d d’ ’e en nf fa an nt ts s   : :    d di is sp pa ar ri it té és s    e et t   
é év vo ol lu ut ti io on ns s   e en n   E Eu ur ro op pe e   à à   p pa ar rt ti ir r   d de es s   e en nq qu uê êt te es s   s su ur r   l le es s   F Fo or rc ce es s   d de e   t tr ra av va ai il l, ,   1 19 99 92 2- -2 20 00 05 5, ,   2 20 00 07 7, ,   5 56 6   
p p. .      
N N° °    1 14 47 7. .    – –    M Ma ag ga al li i    B BA AR RB BI IE ER RI I, ,    P Po op pu ul la at ti io on n    e en n    t tr ra an ns si it ti io on n. .    D Di ix x    c co om mm mu un ni ic ca at ti io on ns s    p pr ré és se en nt té ée es s    a au u   
X XX XV V
e e   C Co on ng gr rè ès s   g gé én né ér ra al l   d de e   l la a   p po op pu ul la at ti io on n, ,   T To ou ur rs s, ,   F Fr ra an nc ce e, ,   1 18 8- -2 23 3   j ju ui il ll le et t   2 20 00 05 5, ,   2 20 00 07 7, ,   2 20 01 1   p p. .      
N N° °    1 14 46 6. .    – –    F Fr ra an nç ço oi is s    C CH HA AP PI IR RE EA AU U, ,    L La a    m mo or rt ta al li it té é    d de es s    m ma al la ad de es s    m me en nt ta au ux x    h ho os sp pi it ta al li is sé és s    e en n    F Fr ra an nc ce e   
p pe en nd da an nt t   l la a   d de eu ux xi iè èm me e   g gu ue er rr re e   m mo on nd di ia al le e, ,   2 20 00 07 7, ,   3 36 6   p p. .      
N N° °   1 14 45 5. .   – –   M Ma ar ry ys se e   M MA AR RP PS SA AT T, ,   E Ex xp pl lo or re er r   l le es s   f fr ro on nt ti iè èr re es s. .   R Re ec ch he er rc ch he es s   s su ur r   d de es s   c ca at té ég go or ri ie es s   « «   e en n   m ma ar rg ge e   
» », ,   M Mé ém mo oi ir re e   p pr ré és se en nt té é   e en n   v vu ue e   d de e   l l’ ’h ha ab bi il li it ta at ti io on n   à à   d di ir ri ig ge er r   d de es s   r re ec ch he er rc ch he es s   e en n   s so oc ci io ol lo og gi ie e, ,   
2 20 00 07 7, ,   2 27 74 4   p p. .   
N N° °   1 14 44 4. .   – –   A Ar rn na au ud d   R RÉ ÉG GN NI IE ER R- -L LO OI IL LI IE ER R   e et t   P Pa as sc ca al l   S SE EB BI IL LL LE E, ,   M Mo od di if fi ic ca at ti io on ns s   t to o   t th he e   G Ge en ne er ra at ti io on ns s   a an nd d   
G Ge en nd de er r   S Su ur rv ve ey ys s   q qu ue es st ti io on nn na ai ir re e   i in n   F Fr ra an nc ce e   ( (w wa av ve e   1 1) ), ,   1 19 92 2   p p. .   
N N° °   1 14 43 3. .   – –   A Ar ri ia an ne e   P PA AI IL LH HÉ É   e et t   A An nn ne e   S SO OL LA AZ Z, ,   L L’ ’e en nq qu uê êt te e   F Fa am mi il ll le es s   e et t   e em mp pl lo oy ye eu ur rs s. .   P Pr ro ot to oc co ol le e   d d’ ’u un ne e   
d do ou ub bl le e   e en nq qu uê êt te e   e et t   b bi il la an n   d de e   c co ol ll le ec ct te e, ,   1 18 80 0   p p. .   
N N° °   1 14 42 2. .   – –   A An nn ni ie e   B BA AC CH HE EL LO OT T   e et t   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   d de e   M MO OU UZ ZO ON N, ,   D Do on nn né ée es s   d de e   l l’ ’e en nq qu uê êt te e   « «   C Ca ar ra ac ct té ér ri is st ti iq qu ue es s   
d de es s   c co ou up pl le es s   d de em ma an nd da an nt t   u un ne e   f fé éc co on nd da at ti io on n   i in n   v vi it tr ro o   e en n   F Fr ra an nc ce e   » », ,   2 20 00 07 7, ,   4 44 4   p p. .   
N N° °   1 14 41 1. .   – –O Ol li iv vi ia a   E EK KE ER RT T- -J JA AF FF FÉ É, ,   S Sh ho os sh ha an na a   G GR RO OS SS SB BA AR RD D   e et t   R Ré ém mi i   M MO OU UG GI IN N, ,   E Ec co on no om mi ic c   A An na al ly ys si is s   
o of f   t th he e   C Ch hi il ld db be ea ar ri in ng g   D De ec ci is si io on n, ,   2 20 00 07 7, ,   1 10 08 8   p p. .   
N N° °    1 14 40 0. .    – –    V Vé ér ro on ni iq qu ue e    H HE ER RT TR RI IC CH H    a an nd d    M Ma ar ri ie e    L LE ES SC CL LI IN NG GA AN ND D, ,    T Tr ra an ns si it ti io on n    t to o    a ad du ul lt th ho oo od d    a an nd d   
g ge en nd de er r: :   c ch ha an ng ge es s   i in n   r ru ur ra al l   M Ma al li i   
N N° °   1 13 39 9. .   – –   P Pa at tr ri ic ck k   S SI IM MO ON N   e et t   M Ma ar rt ti in n   C CL LÉ ÉM ME EN NT T, ,   R Ra ap pp po or rt t   d de e   l l’ ’e en nq qu uê êt te e   « «   M Me es su ur re e   d de e   l la a   d di iv ve er rs si it té é   » ». .   
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N N° °   1 13 38 8. .   – –   M Ma ag ga al li i   B BA AR RB BI IE ER RI I, ,   A Al lf fr re ed d   N NI IZ ZA AR RD D   e et t   L La au ur re en nt t   T TO OU UL LE EM MO ON N, ,   É Éc ca ar rt t   d de e   t te em mp pé ér ra at tu ur re e   e et t   
m mo or rt ta al li it té é   e en n   F Fr ra an nc ce e, ,   2 20 00 06 6, ,   8 80 0   p p. .   
N N° °   1 13 37 7. .   – –   J Je ea an n- -L Lo ou ui is s   P PA AN N   K KE E   S SH HO ON N, ,   M Mo ob bi il li it té és s   i in nt te er rn ne es s   d di if ff fé ér re en nt ti ie el ll le es s   e en n   q qu ua ar rt ti ie er rs s   s se en ns si ib bl le es s   
e et t   s sé ég gr ré ég ga at ti io on n, ,   2 20 00 06 6, ,   4 42 2   p p. .   
N N° °   1 13 36 6. .   – –   F Fr ra an nc ci is sc co o   M MU UN NO OZ Z- -P PE ER RE EZ Z, ,   S So op ph hi ie e   P PE EN NN NE EC C, ,   a av ve ec c   l la a   c co ol ll la ab bo or ra at ti io on n   d de e   G Ge en ne ev vi iè èv ve e   
H Ho ou ur ri ie et t   S Se eg ga ar rd d, ,   É Év vo ol lu ut ti io on n   f fu ut tu ur re e   d de e   l la a   p po op pu ul la at ti io on n   d de es s   m ma ag gi is st tr ra at ts s   e et t   p pe er rs sp pe ec ct ti iv ve es s   d de e   
c ca ar rr ri iè èr re e, ,   2 20 00 01 1- -2 20 04 40 0, ,   2 20 00 06 6, ,   X XX XX X   + +   1 11 14 4   p p. .   
N N° °    1 13 35 5. .    – –    A Al le ex xa an nd dr re e    D DJ JI IR RI IK KI IA AN N    e et t    V Va al lé ér ri ie e    L LA AF FL LA AM MM ME E, ,    s so ou us s    l la a    d di ir re ec ct ti io on n    d de e   
M Ma ar ry ys se e   M MA AR RP PS SA AT T, ,    L Le es s    f fo or rm me es s    m ma ar rg gi in na al le es s    d de e    l lo og ge em me en nt t. .    É Ét tu ud de e    b bi ib bl li io og gr ra ap ph hi iq qu ue e    e et t   
m mé ét th ho od do ol lo og gi iq qu ue e   d de e   l la a   p pr ri is se e   e en n   c co om mp pt te e   d du u   l lo og ge em me en nt t   n no on n   o or rd di in na ai ir re e, ,   2 20 00 06 6, ,   2 24 40 0   p p. .   
N N° °    1 13 34 4. .    – –    C Ca at th he er ri in ne e    B BO ON NV VA AL LE ET T    e et t    É Év va a    L LE EL LI IÈ ÈV VR RE E, ,    P Pu ub bl li ic ca at ti io on ns s    c ch ho oi is si ie es s    a au ut to ou ur r    d de e   
l l’ ’e en nq qu uê êt te e   « «   B Bi io og gr ra ap ph hi ie es s   e et t   e en nt to ou ur ra ag ge e   » », ,   2 20 00 06 6, ,   1 13 34 4   p p. .   
N N° °    1 13 33 3. .    – –    A Ar rn na au ud d    R RÉ ÉG GN NI IE ER R- -L LO OI IL LI IE ER R, ,    P Pr ré és se en nt ta at ti io on n, ,    q qu ue es st ti io on nn na ai ir re e    e et t    d do oc cu um me en nt ta at ti io on n    d de e   
l l’ ’« «   É Ét tu ud de e   d de es s   r re el la at ti io on ns s   f fa am mi il li ia al le es s   e et t   i in nt te er rg gé én né ér ra at ti io on nn ne el ll le es s   » »   ( (E Er rf fi i) ). .   V Ve er rs si io on n   f fr ra an nç ça ai is se e   
d de e   l l’ ’e en nq qu uê êt te e   « «   G Ge en ne er ra at ti io on ns s   a an nd d   G Ge en nd de er r   S Su ur rv ve ey y   » »   ( (G GG GS S) ), ,   2 20 00 06 6, ,   2 23 38 8   p p. .   
N N° °   1 13 32 2. .   – –   L Lu uc ci ie e   B BO ON NN NE ET T   e et t   L Lo ou ui is s   B BE ER RT TR RA AN ND D   ( (s so ou us s   l la a   d di ir re ec ct ti io on n   d de e) ), ,   M Mo ob bi il li it té és s, ,   h ha ab bi it ta at t   e et t   
i id de en nt ti it té és s, ,   A Ac ct te es s   d de e   l la a   j jo ou ur rn né ée e   d d’ ’é ét tu ud de e   « «   J Je eu un ne es s   c ch he er rc ch he eu ur rs s   » ». .   L Le e   l lo og ge em me en nt t   e et t   l l’ ’h ha ab bi it ta at t   
c co om mm me e   o ob bj je et t   d de e   r re ec ch he er rc ch he e. .   A At te el li ie er r   3 3, ,   2 20 00 05 5, ,   9 92 2   p p. .   
N N° °   1 13 31 1. .   – –   I Is sa ab be el ll le e   F FR RE EC CH HO ON N   e et t   C Ca at th he er ri in ne e   V Vi il ll le en ne eu uv ve e- -G Go ok ka al lp p, ,   É Ét tu ud de e   s su ur r   l l’ ’a ad do op pt ti io on n, ,   2 20 00 05 5, ,   
6 64 4   p p. .   
N N° °    1 13 30 0. .    – –    D Do om mi in ni iq qu ue e    M ME EU UR RS S, ,    A Ar ri ia an ne e    P PA AI IH HL LÉ É    e et t    P Pa at tr ri ic ck k    S SI IM MO ON N, ,    M Mo ob bi il li it té é   
i in nt te er rg gé én né ér ra at ti io on nn ne el ll le e   e et t   p pe er rs si is st ta an nc ce e   d de es s   i in né ég ga al li it té és s. .   L L’ ’a ac cc cè ès s   à à   l l’ ’e em mp pl lo oi i   d de es s   i im mm mi ig gr ré és s   e et t   
d de e   l le eu ur rs s   d de es sc ce en nd da an nt ts s   e en n   F Fr ra an nc ce e, ,   2 20 00 05 5, ,   3 36 6   p p. .   
N N° °    1 12 29 9. .    – –    M Ma ag ga al li i    M MA AZ ZU UY Y, ,    N Ni ic co ol la as s    R RA AZ ZA AF FI IN ND DR RA AT TS SI IM MA A, ,    É Él li is se e    d de e    L LA A   
R RO OC CH HE EB BR RO OC CH HA AR RD D, ,   D Dé ép pe er rd di it ti io on n   d da an ns s   l l’ ’e en nq qu uê êt te e« «   I In nt te en nt ti io on ns s   d de e   f fé éc co on nd di it té é   » », ,   2 20 00 05 5, ,   
3 36 6   p p. .   
N N° °    1 12 28 8. .    – –    L La au ur re e    M MO OG GU UE ER RO OU U    e et t    M Ma ag ga al li i    B BA AR RB BI IE ER RI I, ,    P Po op pu ul la at ti io on n    e et t   p pa au uv vr re et té é    e en n    A Af fr ri iq qu ue e. .   
N Ne eu uf f    c co om mm mu un ni ic ca at ti io on ns s    p pr ré és se en nt té ée es s    à à    l la a    I IV V
e e    C Co on nf fe er re en nc ce e    a af fr ri ic ca ai in ne e    s su ur r    l la a    p po op pu ul la at ti io on n, ,   
T Tu un ni is s, ,   T Tu un ni is si ie e, ,   8 8- -1 12 2   d dé éc ce em mb br re e   2 20 00 03 3, ,   2 20 00 05 5, ,   1 18 84 4   p p. .   
N° 127   . – Jean-Louis PAN KÉ SHON, Les sources de la mobilité résidentielle. Modifications intervenues sur 
les grandes sources de données dans l’étude des migrations, 2005, 30 p.  
N N° °   1 12 26 6. .   – –   T Th hi ie er rr ry y   D DE EB BR RA AN ND D   e et t   A An nn ne e- -G Gi is sè èl le e   P PR RI IV VA AT T, ,   L L’ ’i im mp pa ac ct t   d de es s   r ré éf fo or rm me es s   d de e   1 19 99 93 3   e et t   d de e   
2 20 00 03 3   s su ur r   l le es s   r re et tr ra ai it te es s. .   U Un ne e   a an na al ly ys se e   à à   l l’ ’a ai id de e   d du u   m mo od dè èl le e   d de e   m mi ic cr ro os si im mu ul la at ti io on n   A Ar rt té ém mi is s, ,   
2 20 00 05 5, ,   2 28 8   p p. .   
N N° °    1 12 25 5. .    – –    K Ke ee es s    W WA AA AL LD DI IJ JK K    ( (e ed d) ), ,    M Mo or re e    o or r    l le es ss s    t to og ge et th he er r: :    l le ev ve el ls s    o of f    l le eg ga al l    c co on ns se eq qu ue en nc ce es s    o of f   
m ma ar rr ri ia ag ge e, ,    c co oh ha ab bi it ta at ti io on n    a an nd d    r re eg gi is st te er re ed d    p pa ar rt tn ne er rs sh hi ip p    f fo or r    d di if ff fe er re en nt t- -s se ex x    a an nd d    s sa am me e- -s se ex x   
p pa ar rt tn ne er rs s: :   a a   c co om mp pa ar ra at ti iv ve e   s st tu ud dy y   o of f   n ni in ne e   E Eu ur ro op pe ea an n   c co ou un nt tr ri ie es s, ,   2 20 00 05 5, ,   1 19 92 2   p p. .   ( (s s’ ’a ad dr re es ss se er r   à à   
M Ma ar ri ie e   D DI IG GO OI IX X) )   
N N° °   1 12 24 4. .   – –   M Ma ar ri ie e   D DI IG GO OI IX X   e et t   P Pa at tr ri ic ck k   F FE ES ST TY Y   ( (e ed ds s) ), ,   S Sa am me e- -s se ex x   c co ou up pl le es s, ,   s sa am me e- -s se ex x   p pa ar rt tn ne er rs sh hi ip ps s, ,   
a an nd d   h ho om mo os se ex xu ua al l   m ma ar rr ri ia ag ge es s: :   A A   F Fo oc cu us s   o on n   c cr ro os ss s- -n na at ti io on na al l   d di if ff fe er re en nt ti ia al ls s, ,   2 20 00 04 4, ,   3 30 04 4   p p. .   
N° 123. – Marie DIGOIX et Patrick FESTY (sous la dir.), Séminaire « Comparaisons 
européennes », années 2001-2002, 2004, 220 p. 
N N° °    1 12 22 2. .    – –    E Em mm ma an nu ue el ll le e    G GU UY YA AV VA AR RC CH H    e et t    G Gi il ll le es s    P PI IS SO ON N, ,    L Le es s    b ba al lb bu ut ti ie em me en nt ts s    d de e    l la a   
c co on nt tr ra ac ce ep pt ti io on n   e en n   A Af fr ri iq qu ue e   a au u   S Su ud d   d du u   S Sa ah ha ar ra a, ,   s se ep pt te em mb br re e   2 20 00 04 4, ,   4 48 8   p p. .   
N N° °   1 12 21 1. .   – –   M Ma ar ry ys se e   J JA AS SP PA AR RD D   e et t   S St té ép ph ha an ni ie e   C CO ON ND DO ON N, ,   G Ge en nr re e, ,   v vi io ol le en nc ce es s   s se ex xu ue el ll le es s   e et t   j ju us st ti ic ce e. .   
A Ac ct te es s   d de e   l la a   j jo ou ur rn né ée e- -s sé ém mi in na ai ir re e   d du u   2 20 0   j ju ui in n   2 20 00 03 3, ,   2 20 00 04 4, ,   1 13 35 5p p. .   
N N° °   1 12 20 0. .   – –   L La au ur re en nt t   T TO OU UL LE EM MO ON N   e et t   M Ma ag ga al li i   M MA AZ ZU UY Y, ,   C Co om mm me en nt t   p pr re en nd dr re e   e en n   c co om mp pt te e   l l’ ’â âg ge e   à à   
l l’ ’a ar rr ri iv vé ée e    e et t    l la a    d du ur ré ée e    d de e    s sé éj jo ou ur r    e en n    F Fr ra an nc ce e    d da an ns s    l la a    m me es su ur re e    d de e    l la a    f fé éc co on nd di it té é    d de es s   
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N N° °   1 11 19 9. .   – –   C Cé él li in ne e   C CL LÉ ÉM ME EN NT T   e et t   B Bé én né éd di ic ct te e   G GA AS ST TI IN NE EA AU U   ( (c co oo or rd d. .) ), ,   D Dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi ie e   e et t   s so oc ci ié ét té és s. .   
C Co ol ll lo oq qu ue e   i in nt te er rn na at ti io on na al l    « «   J Je eu un ne es s   C Ch he er rc ch he eu ur rs s   » », ,   C Ce er rp po os s- -U Un ni iv ve er rs si it té é   P Pa ar ri is s   X X- -N Na an nt te er rr re e, ,   
1 1
e er r   e et t   2 2   o oc ct to ob br re e   2 20 00 02 2, ,   2 20 00 03 3, ,   3 35 50 0   p p. .   
N N° °   1 11 18 8. .   – –   M Mo on ni iq qu ue e   B BE ER RT TR RA AN ND D, ,   V Vé ér ro on ni iq qu ue e   D DU UP PO ON NT T   e et t   F Fr ra an nc ce e   G GU UE ER RI IN N- -P PA AC CE E   ( (s so ou us s   l la a   
d di ir r. .) ), ,   E Es sp pa ac ce es s   d de e   v vi ie e. .   U Un ne e   r re ev vu ue e   d de es s   c co on nc ce ep pt ts s   e et t   d de es s   a ap pp pl li ic ca at ti io on ns s, ,   2 20 00 03 3, ,   1 18 88 8   p p. .   
N N° °   1 11 17 7. .   – –   S St te ep ph ha an ni ie e   C CO ON ND DO ON N   e et t   A Ar rm me el ll le e   A AN ND DR RO O, ,   Q Qu ue es st ti io on ns s   d de e   g ge en nr re e   e en n   d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi ie e. .   
A Ac ct te es s   d de e   l la a   j jo ou ur rn né ée e   d du u   2 22 2   j ju ui in n   2 20 00 01 1, ,   2 20 00 03 3, ,   1 12 28 8   p p. .   
N N° °    1 11 16 6. .    – –    M Ma ar ry ys se e    J JA AS SP PA AR RD D    e et t    l l’ ’é éq qu ui ip pe e    E En nv ve ef ff f, ,    L Le e    q qu ue es st ti io on nn na ai ir re e    d de e    l l’ ’e en nq qu uê êt te e    E En nv ve ef ff f. .   
E En nq qu uê êt te e   n na at ti io on na al le e   s su ur r   l le es s   v vi io ol le en nc ce es s   e en nv ve er rs s   l le es s   f fe em mm me es s   e en n   F Fr ra an nc ce e, ,   2 20 00 03 3, ,   1 10 0   + +   8 88 8   p p. .   
N N° °   1 11 15 5. .   – –   Z Za ah hi ia a   O OU UA AD DA AH H- -B BE ED DI ID DI I   e et t   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   V VA AL LL LI IN N, ,   D Di is sp pa ar ri it té és s   r ré ég gi io on na al le es s   d de e   l l’ ’é éc ca ar rt t   
d d’ ’â âg ge e   e en nt tr re e   c co on nj jo oi in nt ts s   e en n   A Al lg gé ér ri ie e. .   É Év vo ol lu ut ti io on n   d de ep pu ui is s   1 19 96 66 6, ,   2 20 00 03 3, ,   3 32 2   p p. .   
N N° °   1 11 14 4. .   – –   M Ma ag ga al li i   M MA AZ ZU UY Y, ,   S Si it tu ua at ti io on ns s   f fa am mi il li ia al le es s   e et t   f fé éc co on nd di it té é   s se el lo on n   l le e   m mi il li ie eu u   s so oc ci ia al l. .   R Ré és su ul lt ta at ts s   
à à   p pa ar rt ti ir r   d de e   l l’ ’e en nq qu uê êt te e   E EH HF F   d de e   1 19 99 99 9, ,   2 20 00 02 2, ,   6 60 0   p p. .   
N N° °   1 11 13 3. .– –   J Je ea an n- -P Pa au ul l   S SA AR RD DO ON N, ,   F Fé éc co on nd di it té é   e et t   t tr ra an ns si it ti io on n   e en n   E Eu ur ro op pe e   c ce en nt tr ra al le e   e et t   o or ri ie en nt ta al le e, ,   2 20 00 02 2, ,   
3 38 8   p p. .   
N° 112.– Thérèse LOCOH, Deux études sur la fécondité en Afrique : 1) Structures familiales et évolutions de la 
fécondité  dans  les  pays  à  fécondité  intermédiaire  d'Afrique  de  l'Ouest ;  2) Baisse  de  la  fécondité  et 
mutations familiales en Afrique sub-saharienne, 2002, 24 p. et 30 p. 
N N° °   1 11 11 1. .– –   T Th hi ie er rr ry y   D DE EB BR RA AN ND D   e et t   A An nn ne e- -G Gi is sè èl le e   P PR RI IV VA AT T, ,   I In nd di iv vi id du ua al l   r re ea al l   w wa ag ge es s   o ov ve er r   b bu us si in ne es ss s   
c cy yc cl le e: :    T Th he e    i im mp pa ac ct t    o of f    m ma ac cr ro oe ec co on no om mi ic c    v va ar ri ia at ti io on ns s    o on n    i in nd di iv vi id du ua al l    c ca ar re ee er rs s    a an nd d   
i im mp pl li ic ca at ti io on ns s   c co on nc ce er rn ni in ng g   r re et ti ir re em me en nt t   p pe en ns si io on ns s, ,   2 20 00 02 2, ,   3 38 8   p p. .   
N N° °   1 11 10 0. .– –   R Re ec cu ue ei il l   p pr ré ép pa ar ré é   p pa ar r   A Am ma an nd di in ne e   L LE EB BU UG GL LE E   e et t   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   V VA AL LL LI IN N, ,   S Su ur r   l le e   c ch he em mi in n   d de e   l la a   
t tr ra an ns si it ti io on n. .    O On nz ze e    c co om mm mu un ni ic ca at ti io on ns s    p pr ré és se en nt té ée es s    a au u    X XX XI IV V
e e    C Co on ng gr rè ès s    g gé én né ér ra al l    d de e    l la a   
p po op pu ul la at ti io on n   à à   S Sa al lv va ad do or r   d de e   B Ba ah hi ia a, ,   B Br ré és si il l, ,   a ao oû ût t   2 20 00 01 1, ,   2 20 00 02 2, ,   2 23 34 4   p p. .      
N N° °   1 10 09 9. .– –    É Ér ri ic c    B BR RI IA AN N, ,    J Je ea an n- -M Ma ar rc c    R RO OH HR RB BA AS SS SE ER R, ,    C Ch hr ri is st ti in ne e    T TH HÉ ÉR RÉ É, ,    J Ja ac cq qu ue es s    V VÉ ÉR RO ON N   
( (i in nt te er rv ve en na an nt ts s   e et t   o or rg ga an ni is sa at te eu ur rs s) ), ,   L La a   d du ur ré ée e   d de e   v vi ie e   : :   h hi is st to oi ir re e   e et t   c ca al lc cu ul l. .   S Sé ém mi in na ai ir re e   d de e   l la a   
v va al lo or ri is sa at ti io on n   d de e   l la a   r re ec ch he er rc ch he e, ,   7 7   f fé év vr ri ie er r   2 20 00 00 0, ,   2 20 00 02 2, ,   7 70 0   p p. .   
N N° °   1 10 08 8. .– –   F Fr ra an nc ce e   M ME ES SL LÉ É   e et t   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   V VA AL LL LI IN N, ,   M Mo on nt té ée e   d de e   l l’ ’e es sp pé ér ra an nc ce e   d de e   v vi ie e   e et t   c co on nc ce en nt tr ra at ti io on n   
d de es s   â âg ge es s   a au u   d dé éc cè ès s, ,   2 20 00 02 2, ,   2 20 0   p p. .   
N N° °   1 10 07 7. .– –   A Al le ex xa an nd dr re e   A AV VD DE EE EV V, ,   L La a   m mo or rt ta al li it té é   i in nf fa an nt ti il le e   e en n   R Ru us ss si ie e   e et t   e en n   U UR RS SS S: :   é él lé ém me en nt ts s   p po ou ur r   u un n   
é ét ta at t   d de es s   r re ec ch he er rc ch he es s, ,   2 20 00 02 2, ,   4 48 8   p p. .   
N N° °   1 10 06 6. .– –   I Is sa ab be el ll le e   A AT TT TA AN NÉ É   ( (o or rg ga an ni is sa at tr ri ic ce e) ), ,   L La a   C Ch hi in ne e   e en n   t tr ra an ns si it ti io on n   : :   q qu ue es st ti io on ns s   d de e   p po op pu ul la at ti io on n, ,   
q qu ue es st ti io on ns s   d de e   s so oc ci ié ét té é. .   S Sé ém mi in na ai ir re e   d de e   l la a   v va al lo or ri is sa at ti io on n   d de e   l la a   r re ec ch he er rc ch he e, ,   3 31 1   j ja an nv vi ie er r   e et t   1 1
e er r   
f fé év vr ri ie er r   2 20 00 01 1   ( (s s’ ’a ad dr re es ss se er r   à à   C Cé él li in ne e   P PE ER RR RE EL L) ), ,   2 20 00 02 2, ,   4 46 6   p p. .   
N N° °   1 10 05 5. .– –    A A. .    A AV VD DE EE EV V, ,    J J. .    B BE EL LL LE EN NG GE ER R, ,    A A. .    B BL LU UM M, ,    P P. .    F FE ES ST TY Y, ,    A A. .    P PA AI IL LH HE E, ,    C C. .   
G GO OU US SS SE EF FF F, ,   C C. .   L LE EF FÈ ÈV VR RE E, ,   A A. .   M MO ON NN NI IE ER R, ,   J J. .- -C C. .   S SE EB BA AG G, ,   J J. .   V VA AL LL LI IN N   ( (i in nt te er rv ve en na an nt ts s   
e et t    o or rg ga an ni is sa at te eu ur rs s) ), ,    L La a    s so oc ci ié ét té é    r ru us ss se e    d de ep pu ui is s    l la a    p pe er re es st tr ro oï ïk ka a   : :    r ru up pt tu ur re e, ,    c cr ri is se e    o ou u   
c co on nt ti in nu ui it té é? ?   S Sé ém mi in na ai ir re e   d de e   l la a   v va al lo or ri is sa at ti io on n   d de e   l la a   r re ec ch he er rc ch he e, ,   1 1
e er r   m ma ar rs s   2 20 00 01 1   ( (s s’ ’a ad dr re es ss se er r   à à   
C Cé él li in ne e   P PE ER RR RE EL L) ), ,   2 20 00 01 1, ,   1 12 24 4   p p. .   
N N° °   1 10 04 4. .– –   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   V VÉ ÉR RO ON N, ,   S So op ph hi ie e   P PE EN NN NE EC C, ,   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   L LÉ ÉG GA AR RÉ É, ,   M Ma ar ri ie e   D DI IG GO OI IX X   ( (é éd ds s) ), ,   L Le e   
c co on nt tr ra at t   s so oc ci ia al l   à à   l l’ ’é ép pr re eu uv ve e   d de es s   c ch ha an ng ge em me en nt ts s   d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi iq qu ue es s   ~ ~   T Th he e   S So oc ci ia al l   C Co on nt tr ra ac ct t   
i in n   t th he e   F Fa ac ce e   o of f   D De em mo og gr ra ap ph hi ic c   C Ch ha an ng ge e, ,   A Ac ct te es s   d de es s   2 2
e e   R Re en nc co on nt tr re es s   S Sa au uv vy y, ,   2 20 00 01 1, ,   3 38 86 6   p p. .   
N N° °   1 10 03 3. .– –   G Gi il ll le es s   P PI IS SO ON N, ,   A Al le ex xi is s   G GA AB BA AD DI IN NH HO O, ,   C Ca at th he er ri in ne e   E EN NE EL L, ,   M Ml lo om mp p   ( (S Sé én né ég ga al l) ). .   N Ni iv ve ea au ux x   
e et t   t te en nd da an nc ce es s   d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi iq qu ue es s; ;   1 19 98 85 5- -2 20 00 00 0, ,   2 20 00 01 1, ,   1 18 82 2   p p. .   
N N° °   1 10 02 2. .– –   L La a   f fa am mi il ll le e   e en n   A AO OF F   e et t   l la a   c co on nd di it ti io on n   d de e   l la a   f fe em mm me e. .   R Ra ap pp po or rt t   p pr ré és se en nt té é   a au u   G Go ou uv ve er rn ne eu ur r   
g gé én né ér ra al l    d de e    l l’ ’A AO OF F. .    p pa ar r    D De en ni is se e    S SA AV VI IN NE EA AU U    ( (1 19 93 38 8) ). .    I In nt tr ro od du uc ct ti io on n    d de e    P Pa as sc ca al le e   
B Ba ar rt th hé él lé ém my y, ,   2 20 00 01 1, ,   X XX XI II I- -2 22 22 2   p p. .   
N N° °   1 10 01 1. .– –   J Je ea an n- -P Pa au ul l   S SA AR RD DO ON N, ,   L La a   f fé éc co on nd di it té é   d da an ns s   l le es s   B Ba al lk ka an ns s, ,   2 20 00 01 1, ,   8 88 8   p p. .   
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N N° °   9 99 9. .– –   S S. .   J JU US ST TE EA AU U, ,   J J. .H H. .   K KA AL LT TE EN NB BA AC CH H, ,   D D. .   L LA AP PE EY YR RO ON NN NI IE E, ,   S S. .   R RO OC CH HÉ É, ,      J J. .C C. .   S SE EB BA AG G, ,   
X X. .   T TH HI IE ER RR RY Y   E ET T   M M. .   T TR RI IB BA AL LA AT T   ( (i in nt te er rv ve en na an nt ts s   e et t   o or rg ga an ni is sa at te eu ur rs s) ), ,   L L’ ’i im mm mi ig gr ra at ti io on n   e et t   s se es s   
a am ma al lg ga am me es s. .   S Sé ém mi in na ai ir re e   d de e   l la a   v va al lo or ri is sa at ti io on n   d de e   l la a   r re ec ch he er rc ch he e, ,   2 24 4   m ma ai i   2 20 00 00 0, ,   2 20 00 01 1, ,   9 94 4   p p. .   
N N° °   9 98 8. .– –   J Ju ul li ie et tt te e   H HA AL LI IF FA AX X, ,   L L’ ’i in ns se er rt ti io on n   s so oc ci ia al le e   d de es s   e en nf fa an nt ts s   a ad do op pt té és s. .   R Ré és su ul lt ta at ts s   d de e   l l’ ’e en nq qu uê êt te e   
« «   A Ad do op pt ti io on n      i in nt te er rn na at ti io on na al le e   e et t   i in ns se er rt ti io on n   s so oc ci ia al le e   » », ,   2 20 00 00 0   ( (I In ne ed d   – –   L Le es s   A Am mi is s   d de es s   e en nf fa an nt ts s   d du u   
m mo on nd de e) ), ,   2 20 00 01 1, ,   5 58 8   p p. .   
N N° °   9 97 7. .– –   M Mi ic ch hè èl le e   T TR RI IB BA AL LA AT T, ,   M Mo od dé él li is se er r, ,   p po ou ur r   q qu uo oi i   f fa ai ir re e? ?, ,   2 20 00 01 1, ,   1 10 0   p p. .   
N N° °   9 96 6. .– –   O O. .   E EK KE ER RT T- -J JA AF FF FÉ É, ,   H H. .   L LE ER RI ID DO ON N, ,   S S. .   P PE EN NN NE EC C, ,   I I. .   T TH HÉ ÉR RY Y, ,   L L. .   T TO OU UL LE EM MO ON N   e et t   J J. .- -C C. .   
S SE EB BA AG G   ( (i in nt te er rv ve en na an nt ts s   e et t   o or rg ga an ni is sa at te eu ur rs s) ), ,   É Év vo ol lu ut ti io on n   d de e   l la a   s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e   f fa am mi il li ia al le e. .   S Sé ém mi in na ai ir re e   
d de e   l la a   v va al lo or ri is sa at ti io on n   d de e   l la a   r re ec ch he er rc ch he e, ,   2 28 8   j ju ui in n   2 20 00 00 0, ,   2 20 00 01 1, ,   1 11 10 0   p p. .   
N N° °   9 95 5. .– –    A A. .   A AN ND DR RO O, ,    A A. .   L LE EB BU UG GL LE E, ,    M M. .   L LE ES SC CL LI IN NG GA AN ND D, ,    T T. .   L LO OC CO OH H, ,    M M. .   M MO OU UV VA AG GH HA A- -
S SO OW W, ,    Z Z. .   O OU UA AD DA AH H- -B BE ED DI ID DI I, ,    J J. .    V VA AL LL LI IN N, ,    C C. .    V VA AN ND DE ER RM ME EE ER RS SC CH H, ,    J J. .    V VÉ ÉR RO ON N, ,   
G Ge en nr re e   e et t   d dé év ve el lo op pp pe em me en nt t. .   H Hu ui it t   c co om mm mu un ni ic ca at ti io on ns s   p pr ré és se en nt té ée es s   à à   l la a   C Ch ha ai ir re e   Q Qu ue et te el le et t   2 20 00 00 0, ,   
2 20 00 01 1, ,   1 15 58 8   p p. .   
N N° °   9 94 4. .– –    C C. .    B BO ON NV VA AL LE ET T, ,    C C. .    C CL LÉ ÉM ME EN NT T, ,    D D. .    M MA AI IS SO ON N, ,    L L. .    O OR RT TA AL LD DA A    e et t    T T. .   
V VI IC CH HN NE EV VS SK KA AI IA A, ,   R Ré és se ea au ux x   d de e   s so oc ci ia ab bi il li it té é   e et t   d d’ ’e en nt tr ra ai id de e   a au u   s se ei in n   d de e   l la a   p pa ar re en nt té é   : :   S Si ix x   
c co on nt tr ri ib bu ut ti io on ns s, ,   2 20 00 01 1, ,   1 11 10 0   p p. .   
N N° °   9 93 3. .– –    M Ma ag ga al li i    M MA AZ ZU UY Y    e et t    L La au ur re en nt t    T TO OU UL LE EM MO ON N, ,    É Ét tu ud de e    d de e    l l’ ’h hi is st to oi ir re e    f fa am mi il li ia al le e. .   
P Pr re em mi ie er rs s   r ré és su ul lt ta at ts s   d de e   l l’ ’e en nq qu uê êt te e   e en n   m mé én na ag ge es s, ,   2 20 00 01 1, ,   1 10 00 0   p p. .   
N N° °   9 92 2. .– –    P Po ol li it ti iq qu ue es s   s so oc ci ia al le es s   e en n   F Fr ra an nc ce e   e et t   e en n   R Ru us ss si ie e, ,   I IN NE ED D/ /I IP PS SE EP P, ,   2 20 00 01 1, ,   2 24 46 6   p p. .   
N N° °   9 91 1. .– –    F Fr ra an nç ço oi is se e    M MO OR RE EA AU U, ,    C Co om mm me er rc ce e    d de es s    d do on nn né ée es s    s su ur r    l la a    p po op pu ul la at ti io on n    e et t    l li ib be er rt té és s   
i in nd di iv vi id du ue el ll le es s, ,   2 20 00 01 1, ,   2 20 0   p p. .   + +   A An nn ne ex xe es s. .   
N N° °   9 90 0. .– –    Y Yo ou us ss se ef f    C CO OU UR RB BA AG GE E, ,    S Se er rg gi io o    D DE EL LL LA AP PE ER RG GO OL LA A, ,    A Al la ai in n    D DI IE EC CK KH HO OF FF F, ,   
P Ph hi il li ip pp pe e    F FA AR RG GU UE ES S, ,    E Em mi il le e    M MA AL LE ET T, ,    E El li ia as s    S SA AN NB BA AR R    e et t    J Je ea an n- -C Cl la au ud de e    S SE EB BA AG G   
( (i in nt te er rv ve en na an nt ts s    e et t    o or rg ga an ni is sa at te eu ur rs s) ), ,    L L’ ’a ar rr ri iè èr re e- -p pl la an n    d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi iq qu ue e    d de e    l l’ ’e ex xp pl lo os si io on n    d de e   
v vi io ol le en nc ce e    e en n    I Is sr ra aë ël l- -P Pa al le es st ti in ne e. .    S Sé ém mi in na ai ir re e    d de e    l la a    v va al lo or ri is sa at ti io on n    d de e    l la a    r re ec ch he er rc ch he e, ,    3 30 0   
n no ov ve em mb br re e   2 20 00 00 0, ,   2 20 00 00 0, ,   1 10 06 6   p p. .   
N N° °   8 89 9. .– –    B Bé én né éd di ic ct te e    G GA AS ST TI IN NE EA AU U    e et t    E El li is sa ab be et te e    d de e    C CA AR RV VA AL LH HO O    ( (c co oo or rd do on nn né é    p pa ar r) ), ,   
D Dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi ie e: :   n no ou uv ve ea au ux x   c ch ha am mp ps s, ,   n no ou uv ve el ll le es s   r re ec ch he er rc ch he es s, ,   2 20 00 00 0, ,   3 38 80 0   p p. .   
N N° °   8 88 8. .– –    G Gi il l    B BE EL LL LI IS S, ,    J Je ea an n- -N No oë ël l    B BI IR RA AB BE EN N, ,    M Ma ar ri ie e- -H Hé él lè èn ne e    C CA AZ ZE ES S    e et t    M Ma ar rc c    d de e   
B BR RA AE EK KE EL LE EE ER R   ( (m mo od dé ér ra at te eu ur r   e et t   i in nt te er rv ve en na an nt ts s) ), ,   G Gé én né ét ti iq qu ue e   e et t   p po op pu ul la at ti io on ns s. .   S Sé ém mi in na ai ir re e   d de e   
l la a   v va al lo or ri is sa at ti io on n   d de e   l la a   r re ec ch he er rc ch he e, ,   2 26 6   j ja an nv vi ie er r   2 20 00 00 0, ,   2 20 00 00 0, ,   9 96 6   p p. .   
N N° °   8 87 7. .– –    J Je ea an n- -M Ma ar ri ie e    F FI IR RD DI IO ON N, ,    M Ma ar ry ys se e    M MA AR RP PS SA AT T    e et t    G Gé ér ra ar rd d    M MA AU UG GE ER R   
( (i in nt te er rv ve en na an nt ts s) ), ,    É Ét tu ud de e    d de es s    s sa an ns s- -d do om mi ic ci il le e: :    l le e    c ca as s    d de e    P Pa ar ri is s    e et t    d de e    l l’ ’I Il le e- -d de e- -F Fr ra an nc ce e. .   
S Sé ém mi in na ai ir re e   d de e   l la a   v va al lo or ri is sa at ti io on n   d de e   l la a   r re ec ch he er rc ch he e, ,   1 19 9   a av vr ri il l   2 20 00 00 0, ,   2 20 00 00 0, ,   9 90 0   p p. .   
N N° °   8 86 6. .– –    F Fr ra an nç ço oi is s    H HÉ ÉR RA AN N    e et t    J Je ea an n- -C Cl la au ud de e    S SE EB BA AG G    ( (r re es sp po on ns sa ab bl le es s    m mo od dé ér ra at te eu ur rs s) ), ,   
L L’ ’u ut ti il li is sa at ti io on n    d de es s    s so ou ur rc ce es s    a ad dm mi in ni is st tr ra at ti iv ve es s    e en n    d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi ie e, ,    s so oc ci io ol lo og gi ie e    e et t    s st ta at ti is st ti iq qu ue e   
s so oc ci ia al le e. .   S Sé ém mi in na ai ir re e   d de e   l la a   v va al lo or ri is sa at ti io on n   d de e   l la a   r re ec ch he er rc ch he e, ,   2 20 0   s se ep pt te em mb br re e   2 20 00 00 0, ,   2 20 00 00 0, ,   1 17 70 0   p p. .   
N N° °   8 85 5. .– –    M Mi ic ch he el l    B BO OZ ZO ON N    e et t    T Th hé ér rè ès se e    L LO OC CO OH H    ( (s so ou us s    l la a    d di ir r. .) ), ,    R Ra ap pp po or rt ts s    d de e    g ge en nr re e    e et t   
q qu ue es st ti io on ns s   d de e   p po op pu ul la at ti io on n. .   I II I. .   G Ge en nr re e, ,   p po op pu ul la at ti io on n   e et t   d dé év ve el lo op pp pe em me en nt t, ,   2 20 00 00 0, ,   2 20 00 0   p p. .   
N N° °   8 84 4. .– –    M Mi ic ch he el l    B BO OZ ZO ON N    e et t    T Th hé ér rè ès se e    L LO OC CO OH H    ( (s so ou us s    l la a    d di ir r. .) ), ,    R Ra ap pp po or rt ts s    d de e    g ge en nr re e    e et t   
q qu ue es st ti io on ns s   d de e   p po op pu ul la at ti io on n. .   I I. .   G Ge en nr re e   e et t   p po op pu ul la at ti io on n, ,   F Fr ra an nc ce e   2 20 00 00 0, ,   2 20 00 00 0, ,   2 26 60 0   p p. .   
N N° °   8 83 3. .– –    S St té ép ph ha an ni ie e   C CO ON ND DO ON N, ,   M Mi ic ch he el l   B BO OZ ZO ON N   e et t   T Th hé ér rè ès se e   L LO OC CO OH H, ,   D Dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi ie e, ,   s se ex xe e   
e et t   g ge en nr re e: :   b bi il la an n   e et t   p pe er rs sp pe ec ct ti iv ve es s, ,   2 20 00 00 0, ,   1 10 00 0   p p. .   
N N° °   8 82 2. .– –    O Ol li iv vi ia a   E EK KE ER RT T- -J JA AF FF FE E   e et t   A An nn ne e   S SO OL LA AZ Z, ,   U Un ne em mp pl lo oy ym me en nt t   a an nd d   f fa am mi il ly y   f fo or rm ma at ti io on n   
i in n   F Fr ra an nc ce e, ,   2 20 00 00 0, ,   2 26 6   p p. .   
N N° °   8 81 1. .– –    J Je ea an n- -M Ma ar ri ie e    F FI IR RD DI IO ON N, ,    L L’ ’é ét tu ud de e    d de es s    j je eu un ne es s    s sa an ns s    d do om mi ic ci il le e    d da an ns s    l le es s    p pa ay ys s   
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N N° °   8 80 0. .– –    A Ag ge e, ,   g gé én né ér ra at ti io on n   e et t   a ac ct ti iv vi it té é   : :   v ve er rs s   u un n   n no ou uv ve ea au u   c co on nt tr ra at t   s so oc ci ia al l   ? ?   / /   A Ag ge e, ,   c co oh ho or rt t   a an nd d   
a ac ct ti iv vi it ty y: :    A A   n ne ew w    “ “s so oc ci ia al l    c co on nt tr ra ac ct t” ”? ?, ,    A Ac ct te es s    d de es s    1 1
è èr re es s    r re en nc co on nt tr re es s    S Sa au uv vy y    ( (s s’ ’a ad dr re es ss se er r    à à   
M Ma ar ri ie e   D DI IG GO OI IX X) ), ,   1 19 99 99 9, ,   3 31 14 4   p p. .   
N N° °   7 79 9. .– –    M Ma ar ry ys se e    M MA AR RP PS SA AT T, ,    L Le es s    a ap pp po or rt ts s    r ré éc ci ip pr ro oq qu ue es s    d de es s    m mé ét th ho od de es s    q qu ua an nt ti it ta at ti iv ve es s    e et t   
q qu ua al li it ta at ti iv ve es s   : :   l le e   c ca as s   p pa ar rt ti ic cu ul li ie er r   d de es s   e en nq qu uê êt te es s   s su ur r   l le es s   p pe er rs so on nn ne es s   s sa an ns s   d do om mi ic ci il le e, ,   1 19 99 99 9, ,   2 24 4   
p p. .   
N N° °   7 78 8. .– –    L Le es s   p po op pu ul la at ti io on ns s   d du u   m mo on nd de e, ,   l le e   m mo on nd de e   d de es s   p po op pu ul la at ti io on ns s. .   L La a   p pl la ac ce e   d de e   l l' 'e ex xp pe er rt t   e en n   
s sc ci ie en nc ce es s      s so oc ci ia al le es s   d da an ns s   l le e   d dé éb ba at t   p pu ub bl li ic c, ,   A Ac ct te es s   d de e   l la a   T Ta ab bl le e   r ro on nd de e   p po ou ur r   l l' 'i in na au ug gu ur ra at ti io on n   d de e   
l l' 'I In ne ed d, ,   1 19 99 99 9, ,   5 54 4   p p. .   
N N° °   7 77 7. .– –   I Is sa ab be el ll le e   S SÉ ÉG GU UY Y, ,   F Fa ab bi ie en nn ne e   L LE E   S SA AG GE ER R, ,   E En nq qu uê êt te e   L Lo ou ui is s   H He en nr ry y. .   N No ot ti ic ce e   d de es sc cr ri ip pt ti iv ve e   d de es s   
d do on nn né ée es s   i in nf fo or rm ma at ti iq qu ue es s, ,   1 19 99 99 9, ,   1 15 56 6   p p. .   
N N° °   7 76 6. .– –   I I. .   S SÉ ÉG GU UY Y, ,   H H. .   C CO OL LE EN NÇ ÇO ON N   e et t   C C. .   M MÉ ÉR RI IC C, ,   E En nq qu uê êt te e   L Lo ou ui is s   H He en nr ry y. .   N No ot ti ic ce e   d de es sc cr ri ip pt ti iv ve e   
d de e   l la a   p pa ar rt ti ie e   n no om mi in na at ti iv ve e, ,   1 19 99 99 9, ,   1 12 20 0   p p. .   
N N° °   7 75 5. .– –   A An nn ne e- -C Cl la au ud de e    L LE E    V VO OY YE ER R    ( (s s' 'a ad dr re es ss se er r    à à    H H. .    L LE ER RI ID DO ON N    ) ), ,    L Le es s    p pr ro oc ce es ss su us s    m me en na an nt t    a au u   
d dé és si ir r   d d' 'e en nf fa an nt t   e en n   F Fr ra an nc ce e, ,   1 19 99 99 9, ,   2 20 00 0   p p. .   
N N° °   7 74 4. .– –   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   V VA AL LL LI IN N   e et t   F Fr ra an nc ce e   M ME ES SL LÉ É, ,   L Le e   r rô ôl le e   d de es s   v va ac cc ci in na at ti io on ns s   d da an ns s   l la a   b ba ai is ss se e   d de e   l la a   
m mo or rt ta al li it té é, ,   1 19 99 99 9, ,   2 20 0   p p. .   
N N° °   7 73 3. .– –   B Be er rn na ar rd d   Z ZA AR RC CA A, ,   C Co om mm me en nt t   p pa as ss se er r   d d' 'u un n   é éc ch ha an nt ti il ll lo on n   d de e   m mé én na ag ge es s   à à   u un n   é éc ch ha an nt ti il ll lo on n   d de e   
f fr ra at tr ri ie es s   ? ?   L Le es s   e en nq qu uê êt te es s   « «R Ré és se ea au ux x   f fa am mi il li ia au ux x» »   d de e   1 19 97 76 6, ,   « «P Pr ro oc ch he es s   e et t   p pa ar re en nt ts s» »   d de e   1 19 99 90 0   e et t   
l le e   c ca al lc cu ul l   d d' 'u un n   c co oe ef ff fi ic ci ie en nt t   d de e   p po on nd dé ér ra at ti io on n, ,   1 19 99 99 9, ,   2 20 0   p p. .   
N N° °   7 72 2. .– –   C Ca at th he er ri in ne e   B BO ON NV VA AL LE ET T, ,   F Fa am mi il ll le e- -l lo og ge em me en nt t. .   I Id de en nt ti it té é   s st ta at ti is st ti iq qu ue e   o ou u   e en nj je eu u   p po ol li it ti iq qu ue e? ?   1 19 99 98 8, ,   
2 26 62 2   p p. .   
N N° °   7 71 1. .– –   D De en ni is se e   A AR RB BO ON NV VI IL LL LE E, ,   N No or rm ma al li is sa at ti io on n   d de e   l l' 'h ha ab bi it ta at t   e et t   a ac cc cè ès s   a au u   l lo og ge em me en nt t. .   U Un ne e   é ét tu ud de e   
s st ta at ti is st ti iq qu ue e   d de e   l l' 'é év vo ol lu ut ti io on n   d du u   p pa ar rc c   " "s so oc ci ia al l   d de e   f fa ai it t" "   d de e   1 19 98 84 4   à à   1 19 99 92 2, ,   1 19 99 98 8, ,   3 36 6   p p. .   
N N° °   7 70 0. .– –   F Fa am mi il ll le e, ,   a ac ct ti iv vi it té é, ,   v vi ie ei il ll li is ss se em me en nt t   : :   g gé én né ér ra at ti io on ns s   e et t   s so ol li id da ar ri it té és s. .   B Bi ib bl li io og gr ra ap ph hi ie e   p pr ré ép pa ar ré ée e   
p pa ar r   l le e   C Ce en nt tr re e   d de e   D Do oc cu um me en nt ta at ti io on n   d de e   l l' 'I In ne ed d, ,   1 19 99 98 8, ,   4 44 4   p p. .   
N N° °   6 69 9. .– –   X XX XI II II I
e e   C Co on ng gr rè ès s   g gé én né ér ra al l   d de e   l la a   p po op pu ul la at ti io on n, ,   B Be ei ij ji in ng g, ,   C Ch hi in ne e, ,   1 11 1- -1 17 7   o oc ct to ob br re e   1 19 99 97 7: :   
A A) )    C Co on nt tr ri ib bu ut ti io on n   d de es s   c ch he er rc ch he eu ur rs s   d de e   l l’ ’I In ne ed d   a au u   C Co on ng gr rè ès s, ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   1 17 78 8   p p. .   
B B) )    P Pa ar rt ti ic ci ip pa at ti io on n   o of f   I In ne ed d   R Re es se ea ar rc ch he er rs s   i in n   t th he e   C Co on nf fe er re en nc ce e, ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   1 18 80 0   p p. .   
N N° °   6 68 8. .– –   F Fr ra an nc ce e   M ME ES SL LÉ É   e et t   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   V VA AL LL LI IN N, ,   É Év vo ol lu ut ti io on n   d de e   l la a   m mo or rt ta al li it té é   a au ux x   â âg ge es s   é él le ev vé és s   e en n   
F Fr ra an nc ce e   d de ep pu ui is s   1 19 95 50 0, ,   1 19 99 98 8, ,   4 42 2   p p. .   
N N° °   6 67 7. .– –   I Is sa ab be el ll le e   S SE EG GU UY Y, ,   E En nq qu uê êt te e   J Je ea an n- -N No oë ël l   B Bi ir ra ab be en n   « «L La a   p po op pu ul la at ti io on n   d de e   l la a   F Fr ra an nc ce e   d de e   1 15 50 00 0   à à   
1 17 70 00 0» ». .   R Ré ép pe er rt to oi ir re e   d de es s   s so ou ur rc ce es s   n nu um mé ér ri iq qu ue es s, ,   1 19 99 98 8, ,   3 36 6   p p. .   
N N° °   6 66 6. .– –   A Al la ai in n   B BL LU UM M, ,   I I. .   S St ta at ti is st ti iq qu ue e, ,   d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi ie e   e et t   p po ol li it ti iq qu ue e. .   I II I. .   D De eu ux x   é ét tu ud de es s   s su ur r   l l' 'h hi is st to oi ir re e   
d de e   l la a   s st ta at ti is st ti iq qu ue e   e et t   d de e   l la a   s st ta at ti is st ti iq qu ue e   d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi iq qu ue e   e en n   U UR RS SS S   ( (1 19 92 20 0- -1 19 93 39 9) ), ,   1 19 99 98 8, ,   9 92 2   p p. .   
N N° °   6 65 5. .– –   A An nn ni ie e   L LA AB BO OU UR RI IE E- -R RA AC CA AP PÉ É   e et t   T Th hé ér rè ès se e   L LO OC CO OH H, ,   G Ge en nr re e   e et t   d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi ie e   : :   n no ou uv ve el ll le es s   
p pr ro ob bl lé ém ma at ti iq qu ue es s   o ou u   e ef ff fe et t   d de e   m mo od de e   ? ?   1 19 99 98 8, ,   2 27 7   p p. .   
N N° °   6 64 4. .– –   C C. .    B BO ON NV VA AL LE ET T, ,    A A. .    G GO OT TM MA AN N    e et t    Y Y. .    G GR RA AF FM ME EY YE ER R    ( (é éd ds s) ), ,    e et t    I I. .   B Be er rt ta au ux x- -V Vi ia am me e, ,   
D D. .   M Ma ai is so on n   e et t   L L. .   O Or rt ta al ld da a, ,   P Pr ro oc ch he es s   e et t   p pa ar re en nt ts s   : :   l l' 'a am mé én na ag ge em me en nt t   d de es s   t te er rr ri it to oi ir re es s, ,   1 19 99 97 7. .   
N N° °   6 63 3. .– –   C Co or ri in nn ne e   B BE EN NV VE EN NI IS ST TE E   e et t   B Be en no oî ît t   R RI IA AN ND DE EY Y, ,   L Le es s   e ex xc cl lu us s   d du u   l lo og ge em me en nt t   : :   c co on nn na aî ît tr re e   e et t   
a ag gi ir r, ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   2 20 0   p p. .   
N N° °   6 62 2. .– –   S Sy yl lv vi ia a   T T. .   W WA AR RG GO ON N, ,   L La a   d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi ie e   a au u   C Ca an na ad da a, ,   1 19 94 45 5- -1 19 99 95 5, ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   4 40 0   p p. .   
N N° °   6 61 1. .– –   C Cl la au ud de e   R RE EN NA AR RD D, ,   E En nq qu uê êt te e   L Lo ou ui is s   H He en nr ry y. .   B Bi ib bl li io og gr ra ap ph hi ie e   d de e   l l' 'e en nq qu uê êt te e, ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   8 82 2   p p. .   
N N° °   6 60 0. .– –   H H. .    A AG GH HA A, ,    J J. .C C. .    C CH HA AS ST TE EL LA AN ND D, ,    Y Y. .    C CO OU UR RB BA AG GE E, ,    M M. .    L LA AD DI IE ER R- -F FO OU UL LA AD DI I, ,   
A A. .H H. .   M ME EH HR RY YA AR R, ,   F Fa am mi il ll le e   e et t   f fé éc co on nd di it té é   à à   S Sh hi ir ra az z   ( (1 19 99 96 6) ), ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   6 60 0   p p. .   
N N° °   5 59 9. .– –   C Ca at th he er ri in ne e    B BO ON NV VA AL LE ET T, ,    D Do om mi in ni iq qu ue e    M MA AI IS SO ON N    e et t    L La au ur re en nt t    O OR RT TA AL LD DA A, ,    A An na al ly ys se e   
t te ex xt tu ue el ll le e   d de es s   e en nt tr re et ti ie en ns s   « «P Pr ro oc ch he es s   e et t   P Pa ar re en nt ts s» », ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   3 32 2   p p. .   
N N° °   5 58 8. .– –   B B. .   B BA AC CC CA AÏ ÏN NI I, ,   M M. .   B BA AR RB BI IE ER RI I, ,   S S. .   C CO ON ND DO ON N   e et t   M M. .   D DI IG GO OI IX X   ( (é éd ds s) ), ,   
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I I. .   M Me es su ur re es s   d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi iq qu ue es s   d da an ns s   d de es s   p pe et ti it te es s   p po op pu ul la at ti io on ns s, ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   5 50 0   p p. .   
I II I. .   N Nu up pt ti ia al li it té é   – –   f fé éc co on nd di it té é   – –   r re ep pr ro od du uc ct ti io on n, ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   1 12 20 0   p p. .   
I II II I. .   H Hi is st to oi ir re e   d de es s   p po op pu ul la at ti io on ns s, ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   9 90 0   p p. .   
I IV V. .   É Éc co on no om mi ie e   e et t   e em mp pl lo oi i, ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   5 50 0   p p. .   
V V. .   V Vi ie ei il ll li is ss se em me en nt t   – –   r re et tr ra ai it te e, ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   6 66 6   p p. .   
V VI I. .   F Fa am mi il ll le e, ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   1 12 28 8   p p. .   
V VI II I. .   S Sa an nt té é   – –   m mo or rt ta al li it té é, ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   1 13 36 6   p p. .   
V VI II II I. .   P Po op pu ul la at ti io on n   e et t   e es sp pa ac ce e, ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   1 12 20 0   p p. .   
I IX X. .   M Mi ig gr ra at ti io on n   – –   i in nt té ég gr ra at ti io on n, ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   9 96 6   p p. .   
N N° °   5 57 7. .– –   I Is sa ab be el ll le e    S SÉ ÉG GU UY Y    e et t    C Co or ri in nn ne e    M MÉ ÉR RI IC C, ,    E En nq qu uê êt te e    L Lo ou ui is s    H He en nr ry y. .    N No ot ti ic ce e    d de es sc cr ri ip pt ti iv ve e    n no on n   
n no om mi in na at ti iv ve e, ,   1 19 99 97 7, ,   1 10 06 6   p p. .   
N N° °   5 56 6. .– –   M Má ái ir re e    N Ní í    B BH HR RO OL LC CH HÁ ÁI IN N    a an nd d    L La au ur re en nt t    T TO OU UL LE EM MO ON N, ,    E Ex xp pl lo or ra at to or ry y    a an na al ly ys si is s    o of f   
d de em mo og gr ra ap ph hi ic c   d da at ta a   u us si in ng g   g gr ra ap ph hi ic ca al l   m me et th ho od ds s, ,   1 19 99 96 6, ,   5 50 0   p p. .   
N N° °   5 55 5. .– –   L La au ur re en nt t    T TO OU UL LE EM MO ON N    e et t    C Ca at th he er ri in ne e    d de e    G GU UI IB BE ER RT T- -L LA AN NT TO OI IN NE E, ,    E En nq qu uê êt te es s    s su ur r    l la a   
f fé éc co on nd di it té é   e et t   l la a   f fa am mi il ll le e   d da an ns s   l le es s   p pa ay ys s   d de e   l l' 'E Eu ur ro op pe e   ( (r ré ég gi io on ns s   E EC CE E   d de es s   N Na at ti io on ns s   u un ni ie es s) ). .   
R Ré és su ul lt ta at ts s   d de e   l l' 'e en nq qu uê êt te e   f fr ra an nç ça ai is se e, ,   1 19 99 96 6, ,   8 84 4   p p. .   
N N° °   5 54 4. .– –   G G. .   B BA AL LL LA AN ND D, ,   G G. .   B BE EL LL LI IS S, ,   M M. .   D DE E   B BR RA AE EK KE EL LE EE ER R, ,   F F. .   D DE EP PO OI ID D, ,   M M. .   L LE EF FE EB BV VR RE E, ,   
I I. .   S SE EG GU UY Y, ,   G Gé én né éa al lo og gi ie es s   e et t   r re ec co on ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   d de e   f fa am mi il ll le es s. .   A An na al ly ys se e   d de es s   b be es so oi in ns s, ,   1 19 99 96 6, ,   4 44 4   
p p. .   
N N° °   5 53 3. .– –   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   V VA AL LL LI IN N   e et t   F Fr ra an nc ce e   M ME ES SL LÉ É, ,   C Co om mm me en nt t   s su ui iv vr re e   l l' 'é év vo ol lu ut ti io on n   d de e   l la a   m mo or rt ta al li it té é   p pa ar r   
c ca au us se e   m ma al lg gr ré é   l le es s   d di is sc co on nt ti in nu ui it té és s   d de e   l la a   s st ta at ti is st ti iq qu ue e   ? ?   L Le e   c ca as s   d de e   l la a   F Fr ra an nc ce e   d de e   1 19 92 25 5   à à   1 19 99 93 3, ,   
1 19 99 96 6, ,   4 46 6p p   . .   
N N° °   5 52 2. .– –   C Ca at th he er ri in ne e    B BO ON NV VA AL LE ET T    e et t    E Ev va a    L LE EL LI IÈ ÈV VR RE E, ,    L La a    n no ot ti io on n    d d' 'e en nt to ou ur ra ag ge e, ,    u un n    o ou ut ti il l    p po ou ur r   
l l' 'a an na al ly ys se e   d de e   l l' 'é év vo ol lu ut ti io on n   d de es s   r ré és se ea au ux x   i in nd di iv vi id du ue el ls s, ,   1 19 99 96 6, ,   1 18 8   p p. .   
N N° °   5 51 1. .– –   A Al le ex xa an nd dr re e    A AV VD DE EE EV V, ,    A Al la ai in n    B BL LU UM M    e et t    S Se er rg ge e    Z ZA AK KH HA AR RO OV V, ,    L La a    m mo or rt ta al li it té é    a a- -t t- -e el ll le e   
v vr ra ai im me en nt t   a au ug gm me en nt té é   b br ru ut ta al le em me en nt t   e en nt tr re e   1 19 99 91 1   e et t   1 19 99 95 5? ?, ,   1 19 99 96 6, ,   8 80 0   p p. .   
N N° °   5 50 0. .– –   F Fr ra an nc ce e    M ME ES SL LÉ É, ,    V Vl la ad di im mi ir r    S SH HK KO OL LN NI IK KO OV V, ,    V Vé ér ro on ni iq qu ue e    H HE ER RT TR RI IC CH H    e et t    J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   
V VA AL LL LI IN N, ,   T Te en nd da an nc ce es s   r ré éc ce en nt te es s   d de e   l la a   m mo or rt ta al li it té é   p pa ar r   c ca au us se e   e en n   R Ru us ss si ie e, ,   1 19 96 65 5- -1 19 99 93 3, ,   1 19 99 95 5, ,   
7 70 0   p p. .   
                            A Av ve ec c, ,   e en n   s su up pp pl lé ém me en nt t, ,   1 1   v vo ol lu um me e   d d' 'A An nn ne ex xe es s   d de e   3 38 84 4   p p. .   
N N° °   4 49 9. .– –      J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   V VA AL LL LI IN N, ,   E Es sp pé ér ra an nc ce e   d de e   v vi ie e   : :   q qu ue el ll le e   q qu ua an nt ti it té é   p po ou ur r   q qu ue el ll le e   q qu ua al li it té é   d de e   v vi ie e   ? ?, ,   
1 19 99 95 5, ,   2 24 4   p p. .   
   
   
   
N N° °   4 48 8. .– –   F Fr ra an nç ço oi is s   H HÉ ÉR RA AN N, ,   F Fi ig gu ur re es s   e et t   l lé ég ge en nd de es s   d de e   l la a   p pa ar re en nt té é: :   
I I. .   V Va ar ri ia at ti io on ns s   s su ur r   l le es s   f fi ig gu ur re es s   é él lé ém me en nt ta ai ir re es s, ,   1 19 99 95 5, ,   1 11 14 4   p p. .   
I II I. .   L La a   m mo od dé él li is sa at ti io on n   d de e   l l' 'é éc ca ar rt t   d d' 'â âg ge e   e et t   l la a   r re el la at ti io on n   g gr ro ou up pe e/ /i in nd di iv vi id du u, ,   1 19 99 95 5, ,   8 84 4   p p. .   
I II II I. .   T Tr ro oi is s   é ét tu ud de es s   d de e   c ca as s   s su ur r   l l' 'é éc ca ar rt t   d d' 'â âg ge e: :   T To ou ua ar re eg gs s, ,   A Al ly ya aw wa ar ra a, ,   W Wa ar rl lp pi ir ri i, ,   1 19 99 95 5, ,   1 10 02 2   p p. .   
I IV V. .   L Le e   r ro ou ul le em me en nt t   d de es s   a al ll li ia an nc ce es s, ,   1 19 99 95 5, ,   6 60 0   p p. .   
V V. .   P Pe et ti it te e   g gé éo om mé ét tr ri ie e   f fr ra ac ct ta al le e   d de e   l la a   p pa ar re en nt té é, ,   1 19 99 95 5, ,   4 42 2   p p. .   
V VI I. .   A Ar rb bo or r   j ju ur ri is s. .   L Lo og gi iq qu ue e   d de es s   f fi ig gu ur re es s   d de e   p pa ar re en nt té é   a au u   M Mo oy ye en n   A Ag ge e, ,   1 19 99 96 6, ,   6 62 2   p p. .   
V VI II I. .   D De e   G Gr ra an ne et t   à à   L Lé év vi i- -S St tr ra au us ss s, ,   1 19 99 96 6, ,   1 16 62 2   p p. .   
V VI II II I. .   L Le es s   v vi ie es s   p pa ar ra al ll lè èl le es s. .   U Un ne e   a an na al ly ys se e   d de e   l la a   c co o- -a al ll li ia an nc ce e   c ch he ez z   l le es s   E Et to or ro o   d de e   N No ou uv ve el ll le e- -
G Gu ui in né ée e, ,   1 19 99 96 6, ,   8 80 0   p p. .   
I IX X. .   A Am mb br ry ym m   o ou u   l l' 'é én ni ig gm me e   d de e   l la a   s sy ym mé ét tr ri ie e   o ob bl li iq qu ue e   : :   h hi is st to oi ir re e   d d' 'u un ne e   c co on nt tr ro ov ve er rs se e, ,   1 19 99 96 6, ,   1 13 36 6   
p p. .   
N N° °   4 47 7. .– –   O Ol li iv vi ia a    E EK KE ER RT T- -J JA AF FF FÉ É, ,    D De en ni is se e    A AR RB BO ON NV VI IL LL LE E    e et t    J Jé ér rô ôm me e    W WI IT TT TW WE ER R, ,    C Ce e    q qu ue e   
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N N° °   4 46 6. .– –      L La au ur re en nt t   T TO OU UL LE EM MO ON N, ,   R Ré ég gr re es ss si io on n   l lo og gi is st ti iq qu ue e   e et t   r ré ég gr re es ss si io on n   s su ur r   l le es s   r ri is sq qu ue es s. .   D De eu ux x   s su up pp po or rt ts s   
d de e   c co ou ur rs s, ,   1 19 99 95 5, ,   5 56 6   p p. .   
N N° °   4 45 5. .– –   G Gr ra az zi ie el ll la a    C CA AS SE EL LL LI I, ,    F Fr ra an nc ce e    M ME ES SL LÉ É    e et t    J Ja ac cq qu ue es s    V VA AL LL LI IN N, ,    L Le e    t tr ri io om mp ph he e    d de e    l la a   
m mé éd de ec ci in ne e. .   É Év vo ol lu ut ti io on n   d de e   l la a   m mo or rt ta al li it té é   e en n   E Eu ur ro op pe e   d de ep pu ui is s   l le e   d dé éb bu ut t   d de e   s si iè èc cl le e, ,   1 19 99 95 5, ,   6 60 0   p p. .   
N N° °   4 44 4. .– –   M Ma ag ga al li i    B BA AR RB BI IE ER RI I, ,    A Al la ai in n    B BL LU UM M, ,    E El le en na a    D DO OL LG GI IK KH H, ,    A Am mo on n    E ER RG GA AS SH HE EV V, ,    L La a   
t tr ra an ns si it ti io on n   d de e   f fé éc co on nd di it té é   e en n   O Ou uz zb bé ék ki is st ta an n, ,   1 19 99 94 4, ,   7 76 6   p p. .   
N N° °   4 43 3. .– –   M Ma ar rc c   D De e   B BR RA AE EK KE EL LE EE ER R   e et t   G Gi il l   B BE EL LL LI IS S, ,   G Gé én né éa al lo og gi ie es s   e et t   r re ec co on ns st ti it tu ut ti io on ns s   d de e   f fa am mi il ll le es s   
e en n   g gé én né ét ti iq qu ue e   h hu um ma ai in ne e, ,   1 19 99 94 4, ,   6 66 6   p p. .   
N N° °   4 42 2. .– –   S Se er rg ge e    A AD DA AM ME ET TS S, ,    A Al la ai in n   B BL LU UM M   e et t   S Se er rg ge e    Z ZA AK KH HA AR RO OV V, ,   D Di is sp pa ar ri it té és s   e et t    v va ar ri ia ab bi il li it té és s   
d de es s   c ca at ta as st tr ro op ph he es s   d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi iq qu ue es s   e en n   U UR RS SS S, ,   1 19 99 94 4, ,   1 10 00 0   p p. .   
N N° °   4 41 1. .– –   A Al le ex xa an nd dr re e    A AV VD DE EE EV V, ,    A Al la ai in n    B BL LU UM M    e et t    I Ir ri in na a    T TR RO OI IT TS SK KA AJ JA A, ,    L L' 'a av vo or rt te em me en nt t    e et t    l la a   
c co on nt tr ra ac ce ep pt ti io on n   e en n   R Ru us ss si ie e   e et t   d da an ns s   l l' 'e ex x- -U UR RS SS S   : :   h hi is st to oi ir re e   e et t   p pr ré és se en nt t, ,   1 19 99 93 3, ,   7 74 4   p p. .   
N N° °   4 40 0. .– –   G Gi il ll le es s   P PI IS SO ON N   e et t   A An nn na ab be el l   D DE ES SG GR RE EE ES S   D DU U   L LO OU U, ,   B Ba an nd da af fa as ss si i   ( (S Sé én né ég ga al l) )   : :   n ni iv ve ea au ux x   e et t   
t te en nd da an nc ce es s   d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi iq qu ue es s   1 19 97 71 1- -1 19 99 91 1, ,   1 19 99 93 3, ,   4 40 0   p p. .   
N N° °   3 39 9. .– –   M Mi ic ch he el l   L Lo ou ui is s   L LÉ ÉV VY Y, ,   L La a   d dy yn na am mi iq qu ue e   d de es s   p po op pu ul la at ti io on ns s   h hu um ma ai in ne es s, ,   1 19 99 93 3, ,   2 20 0   p p. .   
N N° °   3 38 8. .– –   A Al la ai in n   B BL LU UM M, ,   S Sy ys st tè èm me es s   d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi iq qu ue es s   s so ov vi ié ét ti iq qu ue es s, ,   1 19 99 92 2, ,   1 14 4   + +      X X      p p. .   
N N° °   3 37 7. .– –   E Em mm ma an nu ue el l   L LA AG GA AR RD DE E, ,   G Gi il ll le es s   P PI IS SO ON N, ,   B Be er rn na ar rd d   L LE E   G GU UE EN NN NO O, ,   C Ca at th he er ri in ne e   E EN NE EL L   e et t   
C Ch he ei ik kh h   S SE EC CK K, ,   L Le es s   f fa ac ct te eu ur rs s   d de e   r ri is sq qu ue e   d de e   l l' 'i in nf fe ec ct ti io on n   à à   V VI IH H2 2   d da an ns s   u un ne e   r ré ég gi io on n   r ru ur ra al le e   d du u   
S Sé én né ég ga al l, ,   1 19 99 92 2, ,   7 72 2   p p. .   
N N° °   3 36 6. .– –   A An nn na ab be el l    D DE ES SG GR RE EE ES S    D DU U    L LO OU U    e et t    G Gi il ll le es s    P PI IS SO ON N, ,    L Le es s    o ob bs st ta ac cl le es s    à à    l la a    v va ac cc ci in na at ti io on n   
u un ni iv ve er rs se el ll le e   d de es s   e en nf fa an nt ts s   d de es s   p pa ay ys s   e en n   d dé év ve el lo op pp pe em me en nt t. .   U Un ne e   é ét tu ud de e   d de e   c ca as s   e en n   z zo on ne e   r ru ur ra al le e   
a au u   S Sé én né ég ga al l, ,   1 19 99 92 2, ,   2 26 6   p p. .   
N N° °   3 35 5. .– –   F Fr ra an nc ce e    M ME ES SL LÉ É, ,    V Vl la ad di im mi ir r    S SH HK KO OL LN NI IK KO OV V    e et t    J Ja ac cq qu ue es s    V VA AL LL LI IN N, ,    L La a    m mo or rt ta al li it té é    p pa ar r   
c ca au us se es s   e en n   U UR RS SS S   d de e   1 19 97 70 0   à à   1 19 98 87 7    : :   r re ec co on ns st tr ru uc ct ti io on n   d de e   s sé ér ri ie es s   s st ta at ti is st ti iq qu ue es s   c co oh hé ér re en nt te es s, ,   
1 19 99 92 2, ,   3 36 6   p p. .   
N N° °   3 34 4. .– –   F Fr ra an nc ce e    M ME ES SL LÉ É    e et t    J Ja ac cq qu ue es s    V VA AL LL LI IN N, ,    É Év vo ol lu ut ti io on n    d de e    l la a    m mo or rt ta al li it té é    p pa ar r    c ca an nc ce er r    e et t    p pa ar r   
m ma al la ad di ie es s   c ca ar rd di io o- -v va as sc cu ul la ai ir re es s   e en n   E Eu ur ro op pe e   d de ep pu ui is s   1 19 95 50 0, ,   1 19 99 92 2, ,   4 48 8   p p. .   
N N° °   3 33 3. .– –   D Di id di ie er r    B BL LA AN NC CH HE ET T, ,    V Vi ie ei il ll li is ss se em me en nt t    e et t    p pe er rs sp pe ec ct ti iv ve es s    d de es s    r re et tr ra ai it te es s    : :    a an na al ly ys se es s    d dé ém mo o- -
é éc co on no om mi iq qu ue es s, ,   1 19 99 91 1, ,   1 12 20 0   p p. .   
N N° °   3 32 2. .– –   N No oë ël l   B BO ON NN NE EU UI IL L, ,   D Dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi ie e   d de e   l la a   n nu up pt ti ia al li it té é   a au u   X XI IX Xe e   s si iè èc cl le e, ,   1 19 99 90 0, ,   3 32 2   p p. .   
N N° °   3 31 1. .– –   J Je ea an n- -P Pa au ul l   S SA AR RD DO ON N, ,   L L' 'é év vo ol lu ut ti io on n   d de e   l la a   f fé éc co on nd di it té é    e en n   F Fr ra an nc ce e   d de ep pu ui is s   u un n   d de em mi i- -s si iè èc cl le e, ,   
1 19 99 90 0, ,   1 10 02 2   p p. .   
N N° °   3 30 0. .– –   B Be en no oî ît t    R RI IA AN ND DE EY Y, ,    R Ré ép pe er rt to oi ir re e    d de es s    e en nq qu uê êt te es s    d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi iq qu ue es s    : :    b bi il la an n    p po ou ur r    l la a    F Fr ra an nc ce e   
m mé ét tr ro op po ol li it ta ai in ne e, ,   1 19 98 89 9, ,   2 24 4   p p. .   
N N° °   2 29 9. .– –   T Th hé ér rè ès se e    L LO OC CO OH H, ,    C Ch ha an ng ge em me en nt t    s so oc ci ia al l    e et t    s si it tu ua at ti io on ns s    m ma at tr ri im mo on ni ia al le es s    : :l le es s    n no ou uv ve el ll le es s   
f fo or rm me es s   d d' 'u un ni io on n   à à   L Lo om mé é, ,   1 19 98 89 9, ,   4 44 4   p p. .   
N N° °   2 28 8. .– –   C Ca at th he er ri in ne e   E EN NE EL L, ,   G Gi il ll le es s   P PI IS SO ON N, ,   e et t   M Mo on ni iq qu ue e   L LE EF FE EB BV VR RE E, ,   M Mi ig gr ra at ti io on ns s   e et t   é év vo ol lu ut ti io on n   d de e   
l la a   n nu up pt ti ia al li it té é. .   L L' 'e ex xe em mp pl le e   d d' 'u un n   v vi il ll la ag ge e   j jo oo ol la a   d du u   s su ud d   d du u   S Sé én né ég ga al l, ,   M Ml lo om mp p, ,   1 19 98 89 9, ,   2 26 6   p p. .   
    ( (S Sé én né ég ga al l) )   d de ep pu ui is s   5 50 0   a an ns s, ,   1 1è èr re e   é éd di it ti io on n   : :   1 19 98 89 9, ,   3 36 6   p p. .   ; ;   2 2è èm me e   é éd di it ti io on n   r re ev vu ue e   e et t   a au ug gm me en nt té ée e      
: :   1 19 99 90 0, ,   4 48 8   p p. .   
N N° °   2 27 7. .– –   N Ni ic co ol la as s    B BR RO OU UA AR RD D, ,    L L' 'e ex xt ti in nc ct ti io on n    d de es s    n no om ms s    d de e    f fa am mi il ll le e    e en n    F Fr ra an nc ce e    : :    u un ne e    a ap pp pr ro oc ch he e, ,   
1 19 98 89 9, ,   2 22 2   p p. .   
N N° °   2 26 6. .– –   G Gi il ll le es s    P PI IS SO ON N, ,    M Mo on ni iq qu ue e    L LE EF FE EB BV VR RE E, ,    C Ca at th he er ri in ne e    E EN NE EL L    e et t    J Je ea an n- -F Fr ra an nç ço oi is s    T TR RA AP PE E, ,   
L L' 'i in nf fl lu ue en nc ce e    d de es s    c ch ha an ng ge em me en nt ts s    s sa an ni it ta ai ir re es s    s su ur r    l l' 'é év vo ol lu ut ti io on n    d de e    l la a    m mo or rt ta al li it té é   : :    l le e    c ca as s    d de e   
M Ml lo om mp p, ,   1 19 98 89 9   , ,   3 36 6   p p. .   
N N° °   2 25 5. .– –   A Al la ai in n   B BL LU UM M   e et t   P Ph hi il li ip pp pe e   F FA AR RG GU UE ES S, ,   E Es st ti im ma at ti io on n   d de e   l la a   m mo or rt ta al li it té é   m ma at te er rn ne el ll le e   d da an ns s   l le es s   
p pa ay ys s    à à    d do on nn né ée es s    i in nc co om mp pl lè èt te es s. .    U Un ne e    a ap pp pl li ic ca at ti io on n    à à    B Ba am ma ak ko o    ( (1 19 97 74 4- -1 19 98 85 5) )    e et t    à à    d d' 'a au ut tr re es s   
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N N° °   2 24 4. .– –   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   V VA AL LL LI IN N   e et t   G Gr ra az zi ie el ll la a   C CA AS SE EL LL LI I, ,   M Mo or rt ta al li it té é   e et t   v vi ie ei il ll li is ss se em me en nt t    d de e    l la a    p po op pu ul la at ti io on n, ,   
1 19 98 89 9, ,   3 30 0   p p. .   
N N° °   2 23 3. .– –   G Ge eo or rg ge es s    T TA AP PI IN NO OS S, ,    D Di id di ie er r    B BL LA AN NC CH HE ET T    e et t    O Ol li iv vi ia a    E EK KE ER RT T- -J JA AF FF FÉ É, ,    P Po op pu ul la at ti io on n    e et t   
d de em ma an nd de e   d de e   c ch ha an ng ge em me en nt ts s   d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi iq qu ue es s, ,   d de em ma an nd de e   e et t   s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e   d de e   c co on ns so om mm ma at ti io on n, ,   
1 19 98 89 9, ,   4 46 6   p p. .   
N N° °   2 22 2. .– –   B Be en no oî ît t    R RI IA AN ND DE EY Y, ,    U Un n    é éc ch ha an nt ti il ll lo on n    p pr ro ob ba ab bi il li is st te e    d de e    A A    à à    Z Z    : :    l l' 'e ex xe em mp pl le e    d de e    l l' 'e en nq qu uê êt te e   
P Pe eu up pl le em me en nt t   e et t   d dé ép pe eu up pl le em me en nt t   d de e   P Pa ar ri is s. .   I IN NE ED D   ( (1 19 98 86 6) ), ,   1 19 98 89 9, ,   1 12 2   p p. .   
N N° °   2 21 1. .– –   N No oë ël l   B BO ON NN NE EU UI IL L   e et t   P Ph hi il li ip pp pe e   F FA AR RG GU UE ES S, ,   P Pr ré év vo oi ir r   l le es s   « «   c ca ap pr ri ic ce es s   » »   d de e   l la a   m mo or rt ta al li it té é. .   
C Ch hr ro on ni iq qu ue e   d de es s   c ca au us se es s   d de e   d dé éc cè ès s   à à   B Ba am ma ak ko o   d de e   1 19 96 64 4   à à   1 19 98 85 5, ,   1 19 98 89 9, ,   4 44 4   p p. .   
N N° °   2 20 0. .– –   F Fr ra an nc ce e   M ME ES SL LÉ É, ,   M Mo or rb bi id di it té é   e et t   c ca au us se es s   d de e   d dé éc cè ès s   c ch he ez z   l le es s   p pe er rs so on nn ne es s   â âg gé ée es s, ,   1 19 98 88 8, ,   1 18 8   p p. .   
N N° °   1 19 9. .– –   H He en nr ri i    L LE ER RI ID DO ON N, ,    A An na al ly ys se e    d de es s    b bi io og gr ra ap ph hi ie es s    m ma at tr ri im mo on ni ia al le es s    d da an ns s    l l' 'e en nq qu uê êt te e    s su ur r    l le es s   
s si it tu ua at ti io on ns s   f fa am mi il li ia al le es s, ,   1 19 98 88 8, ,   6 64 4   p p. .   
N N° °   1 18 8. .– –   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   V VA AL LL LI IN N, ,   L La a   m mo or rt ta al li it té é   e en n   E Eu ur ro op pe e   d de e   1 17 72 20 0   à à   1 19 91 14 4   : :   t te en nd da an nc ce es s   à à   l lo on ng g   t te er rm me e   
e et t   c ch ha an ng ge em me en nt ts s   d de e   s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e   p pa ar r   â âg ge e   e et t   p pa ar r   s se ex xe e, ,   1 19 98 88 8, ,   4 40 0   p p. .   
N N° °   1 17 7. .– –   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s    V VA AL LL LI IN N, ,    É Év vo ol lu ut ti io on n    s so oc ci ia al le e    e et t    b ba ai is ss se e    d de e    l la a    m mo or rt ta al li it té é    : :    c co on nq qu uê êt te e    o ou u   
r re ec co on nq qu uê êt te e   d d' 'u un n   a av va an nt ta ag ge e   f fé ém mi in ni in n   ? ?, ,   1 19 98 88 8, ,   3 36 6   p p. .   
N N° °   1 16 6. .– –   G Gé ér ra ar rd d   C CA AL LO OT T   e et t   G Gr ra az zi ie el ll la a   C CA AS SE EL LL LI I, ,   L La a   m mo or rt ta al li it té é   e en n   C Ch hi in ne e   d d' 'a ap pr rè ès s   l le e   r re ec ce en ns se em me en nt t   
d de e   1 19 98 82 2: :   
   I I. .– –   A An na al ly ys se e   s se el lo on n   l le e   s se ex xe e   e et t   l l' 'â âg ge e   a au u   n ni iv ve ea au u   n na at ti io on na al l   e et t   p pr ro ov vi in nc ci ia al l, ,   1 19 98 88 8, ,   7 72 2   p p. .   
I II I. .– –   T Ta ab bl le es s   d de e   m mo or rt ta al li it té é   p pa ar r   p pr ro ov vi in nc ce e, ,   1 19 98 88 8, ,   1 11 12 2   p p. .   
N N° °   1 15 5. .– –   P Pe et te er r   A AA AB BY Y   ( (s s' 'a ad dr re es ss se er r   à à      J J. .   V VA AL LL LI IN N) ), ,   L Le e   s su ur rp pe eu up pl le em me en nt t, ,   u un n   f fa ac ct te eu ur r   d dé ét te er rm mi in na an nt t   d de e   
l la a   m mo or rt ta al li it té é   p pa ar r   r ro ou ug ge eo ol le e   e en n   A Af fr ri iq qu ue e, ,   1 19 98 87 7, ,   5 52 2   p p. .   
N N° °   1 14 4. .– –   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   V VA AL LL LI IN N, ,   T Th hé éo or ri ie e( (s s) )   d de e   l la a   b ba ai is ss se e   d de e   l la a   m mo or rt ta al li it té é   e et t   s si it tu ua at ti io on n   a af fr ri ic ca ai in ne e, ,   1 19 98 87 7, ,   
4 44 4   p p. .   
N N° °   1 13 3. .– –   K Ku ua ak ku uv vi i    G GB BE EN NY YO ON N    e et t    T Th hé ér rè ès se e    L LO OC CO OH H, ,    D Di if ff fé ér re en nc ce es s    d de e    m mo or rt ta al li it té é    s se el lo on n    l le e    s se ex xe e, ,   
d da an ns s   l l' 'e en nf fa an nc ce e   e en n   A Af fr ri iq qu ue e   a au u   S Su ud d   d du u   S Sa ah ha ar ra a, ,   1 19 98 87 7, ,   3 30 0   p p. .   
N N° °   1 12 2. .– –   P Ph hi il li ip pp pe e    F FA AR RG GU UE ES S, ,    L Le es s    s sa ai is so on ns s    e et t    l la a    m mo or rt ta al li it té é    u ur rb ba ai in ne e    e en n    A Af fr ri iq qu ue e. .    L Le es s    d dé éc cè ès s    à à   
B Ba am ma ak ko o   d de e   1 19 97 74 4   à à   1 19 98 85 5, ,   1 19 98 87 7, ,   3 38 8   p p. .   
N N° °   1 11 1. .– –   G Gi il ll le es s   P PI IS SO ON N, ,   L Le es s   j ju um me ea au ux x   e en n   A Af fr ri iq qu ue e   a au u   S Su ud d   d du u   S Sa ah ha ar ra a   : :   f fr ré éq qu ue en nc ce e, ,   s st ta at tu ut t   s so oc ci ia al l   e et t   
m mo or rt ta al li it té é, ,   1 19 98 87 7, ,   4 48 8   p p. .   
N N° °   1 10 0. .– –   P Ph hi il li ip pp pe e    F FA AR RG GU UE ES S, ,    L La a    m mi ig gr ra at ti io on n    o ob bé éi it t- -e el ll le e    à à    l la a    c co on nj jo on nc ct tu ur re e    p pé ét tr ro ol li iè èr re e    d da an ns s    l le e   
G Go ol lf fe e   ? ?   L L' 'e ex xe em mp pl le e   d du u   K Ko ow we eï ït t, ,   1 19 98 87 7, ,   3 30 0   p p. .   
N N° °   9 9. .– –   D Di id di ie er r   B BL LA AN NC CH HE ET T, ,   D De eu ux x   é ét tu ud de es s   s su ur r   l le es s   r re el la at ti io on ns s   e en nt tr re e   d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi ie e   e et t   s sy ys st tè èm me es s   d de e   
r re et tr ra ai it te e, ,   1 19 98 86 6, ,   2 26 6   p p. .   
N N° °   8 8. .– –   D Di id di ie er r   B BL LA AN NC CH HE ET T, ,   É Éq qu ui il li ib br re e   m ma al lt th hu us si ie en n   e et t   l li ia ai is so on n   e en nt tr re e   c cr ro oi is ss sa an nc ce es s   é éc co on no om mi iq qu ue e   e et t   
d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi iq qu ue e   d da an ns s   l le es s   p pa ay ys s   e en n   d dé év ve el lo op pp pe em me en nt t   : :   u un n   m mo od dè èl le e, ,   1 19 98 86 6, ,   2 20 0   p p. .   
N N° °   7 7. .– –   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   V VA AL LL LI IN N, ,   F Fr ra an nc ce e   M ME ES SL LÉ É   e et t   A Al lf fr re ed d   N NI IZ ZA AR RD D, ,   R Re ec cl la as ss se em me en nt t   d de es s   r ru ub br ri iq qu ue es s   d de e   
l la a   8 8è èm me e   r ré év vi is si io on n   d de e   l la a   C Cl la as ss si if fi ic ca at ti io on n   i in nt te er rn na at ti io on na al le e   d de es s   m ma al la ad di ie es s   s se el lo on n   l l' 'é ét ti io ol lo og gi ie e   e et t   
l l' 'a an na at to om mi ie e, ,   1 19 98 86 6, ,   5 56 6   p p. .   
N N° °      6 6. .– –   P Ph hi il li ip pp pe e   F FA AR RG GU UE ES S, ,   U Un n   a ap pp po or rt t   p po ot te en nt ti ie el l   d de es s   f fo or rm ma at ti io on ns s   s sa an ni it ta ai ir re es s   p po ou ur r   m me es su ur re er r   l la a   
m mo or rt ta al li it té é   d da an ns s   l l' 'e en nf fa an nc ce e   e en n   A Af fr ri iq qu ue e, ,   1 19 98 86 6, ,   3 34 4   p p. .   
N N° °      5 5. .– –   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   V VA AL LL LI IN N   e et t   F Fr ra an nc ce e   M ME ES SL LÉ É, ,   L Le es s   c ca au us se es s   d de e   d dé éc cè ès s   e en n   F Fr ra an nc ce e   d de e   1 19 92 25 5   à à   1 19 97 78 8, ,   
1 19 98 86 6, ,   3 36 6   p p. .   
N N° °      4 4. .– –   G Gr ra az zi ie el ll la a   C CA AS SE EL LL LI I, ,   J Ja ac cq qu ue es s   V VA AL LL LI IN N, ,   J J. .   V VA AU UP PE EL L   e et t   A A. .   Y YA AS SH HI IN N, ,   L L' 'é év vo ol lu ut ti io on n   d de e   l la a   
s st tr ru uc ct tu ur re e   p pa ar r   â âg ge e   d de e   l la a   m mo or rt ta al li it té é   e en n   I It ta al li ie e   e et t   e en n   F Fr ra an nc ce e   d de ep pu ui is s   1 19 90 00 0, ,   1 19 98 86 6, ,   2 28 8   p p. .   
N N° °      3 3. .– –   P Pa au ul l   P PA AI IL LL LA AT T, ,   L Le e   v vé éc cu u   d du u   v vi ie ei il ll li is ss se em me en nt t   e en n   1 19 97 79 9, ,   1 19 98 81 1, ,   1 11 14 4   p p. .   
N N° °   2 2. .– –   C Cl la au ud de e    L LÉ ÉV VY Y, ,    A As sp pe ec ct ts s    s so oc ci io o- -p po ol li it ti iq qu ue es s    e et t    d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi iq qu ue es s    d de e    l la a    p pl la an ni if fi ic ca at ti io on n   








































2  51 
N N° °   1 1. .– –   G Ge eo or rg ge es s   T TA AP PI IN NO OS S, ,   L Le es s   m mé ét th ho od de es s   d d' 'a an na al ly ys se e   e en n   d dé ém mo og gr ra ap ph hi ie e   é éc co on no om mi iq qu ue e, ,   1 19 97 76 6, ,   2 28 88 8   
p p. .   
h
a
l
s
h
s
-
0
0
6
6
0
6
3
0
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
1
7
 
J
a
n
 
2
0
1
2